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When is a citizen morally justified in killing a ruler? A number 
of contemporary writers have tried to justify various kinds and degrees 
of citizen violence on quite diverse moral grounds. I have selected 
from these arguments what I believe to be the most coherent, complete, 
and interesting of them to examine in this paper. Given their diver-
sity of opinion on the nature of political obligation, the responsi-
bilities of governments to the people, the nature of moral justifica-
tion, etc., the diversity and range of their justifications is not 
surprising. My main concern in looking at these arguments is to 
discover if or how each of them would attempt to justify the act of 
ruler killing ~nd whether or not one such justification is more 
satisfactory than another. 
In order to give us some common grounds fo·r compa·ri son of these 
diverse schemes, we need a clearer idea of what constitutes a moral 
justification, especially as it applies to actions in the political 
sphere. To this end we will divide the process of moral justification 
into three functions or requirements which a complete moral 
justification must fulfill. The first of these is the requirement that 
the justificqtion connect the action with a positive mqral rule having 
some general force in the ethical system. To be justified as 11 right 11 
or 11 good 11 an action must be shown to be supportive of 6~ in compli.ance 
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with a concept or rule which likewise has positive content. The second 
requirement for a moral justification concerns not the rule which the 
action supports but those it may violate. It is clear that in many 
cases, and especially with an act as problematic as ruler killing, 
simply relating the action to one moral principle is an insufficient 
justification because of the other moral principles with which it 
conflicts, the most obvious example being the prohibition against 
murder. So a sufficient moral justification must include, by way of 
answering these violations of important moral rules, a way of ordering 
the claims such that the conflicting rules are either overridden or 
accounted for in some way. Finally, a moral justification must be 
generalizable. A justification offered for a particular action in 
particular circumstances must be applicable to other actions of that 
type in similar circumstances. Because of this a complete moral justi-
fication of ruler killing, or of any problematic action, must specify 
the circumstances which affect the moral justifiability of the act. 
If the justification only applies to assassinations in a tyranny and 
then only to the tyrant himself, then the form of government and the 
persons attacked are relevant circumstances which must be stated in 
the justification. It is the clear statement of these objective cri-
teria which allows us to generalize from one isolated instance to a 
class of related acts. We have concluded then that a complete moral 
justification should answer these three questions: first, of what 
moral principle or principles is the action supportive?; second, how 
can the claims of competing moral principles be answered?; and third, 
what criteria are relevant for the genera 1 i zation of the justification 
to the group of actiorts· denoted by :•rule~ killing?"l 
The justifications examined here will be judged on the basis of 
how well they fulfill the three requirements stated above .. We will 
find that none of the types of arguments, to be distinguished below, 
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seems to have any inherent advantage over the others in terms of coher-
ence of the argument or the degree to which it meets the requirements 
for a complete moral justification. Rather, the success of a partie-
ular justification seems to depend more on its indivudual character-
istics than on its belonging to a certain class of arguments. In 
addition, we will find that, while it is not without its problems, 
Richard Brandt•s utilitarian scheme for the justification of acts of 
violence provides the most promising basis for a moral justification 
of certain instances of ruler killing. 
One writer, discussing the problems in trying to sort out the 
opinions on such questions, says: 
There is a certain welter of propositions, arguments, 
theories and doctrines which comes in between the factual 
premises about inequality and violence and any final 
conclusions about the morality of violence. I mean, in 
saying that these things come in, that they must be 
considered. All of them are reasons or reasonings, or 
else they can be improved into reasons or reasonings. 
All of them obviously, must be made de2ently clear and 
explicit before their value is judged. 
In addition to making the reasonings 11decently clear and explicit .. 
before judging them, it is also helpful to group them along the lines 
of their basic premises or assumptions. This classification is not 
intended to be controversial nor especially enli9htening in and of 
itself but should be simply an aid to analyzing and comparing a rather 
large and unwieldy mass of argument. When the necessary clarification 
of these contemporary justifications has been accomplished their 
positions on the question of ruler killing may be clear or, it is 
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hoped, can be easily derived. 
T~e problem of citizen violence against political rulers is only 
one of the possible applications within the scope of these somewhat 
more general arguments. To avoid confusion about the scope of this 
more specific question we will here define the class of 11 political 
rulers 11 as those persons one might call 11 heads of government. 11 11 Poli-
tical rulers 11 thus includes monarchs, dictators, tyrants, presidents, 
etc., and may include several members of a government in which the 
function of 11 ruler 11 is shared, e.g. in a military junta. Though some 
~f the arguments discus~ed here might in other circumstances be broad-
ened 'to include the assassination of~ person of considerable poli-
tical power, for us the term 11 political rulers 11 will be restricted to 
those persons previously described. 
The-problem of violence against a ruler has a long history in 
political thought. In the 16th century, the Vindicae Contra Tyrannos 
(A Defense of Liberty Against Tyrants) argued for the right of 
res is ta nee against a tyrant. 
The officers of the kingdom are the guardians and proteG-
tor of these covenants and contracts. He who maliciously 
or wilfully violates these conditions, is questionless a 
tyrant by practice. And therefore the officers of state 
may judge him according to the laws, and if he support his 
tyranny by strong hands, their duty binds them, when by no 
other means it can be effected by force of arms to suppress 
him.3 
Juan de Mariana in De Rege et Regis Institutione (1599), and Francisco 
Suarez in his Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore (1611), defend 
the right of resistance of the people against a ruler who has broken 
his covenant with them. 4 In the almost four hunqred years since these 
writings, the circumstances of government have obviously changed. 
The world powers are no longer 11 ruled 11 by abs'olute monarchs but 
11 governed 11 by larger groups of people with much less power in any one 
person's hands. 
distributed has 
Whether or not this alteration in the way pfwer is 
an effect on the question of violence agaJJlst the 
powerful remains to be seen. 
Various "people's" revolutions, in Algeria and Cuba for example, 
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the activities of terrorist groups like the IRA in Northern Ireland, 
the civil rights movement here in the United States, numerous political 
assassinations, and other recent events give a special urgency to 
philosophical analysis of all the aspects of violence. Contemporary 
philosophical literature contains a significant amount of work on 
violence in general and possible justifications of citizen violence 
in particular.~ 
All of the arguments to be discussed here are attempts to morally 
justify violence in certain specified circumstances. These arguments 
can and should be distinguished from those arguments, also found in the 
literature, which treat violence in terms of its expedience. The 
argument from expediency may conclude that violence never in fact 
accomplishes what was intended by its agents and thus is never justi-
fied or it may decide that when violence accomplishes the desired end, 
which it sometimes does, then it is justified.5 Neither of these 
reasonings, however, seems to involve a moral prohibition or justifi-
cation. Neither is concerned with moral principles or obligations but 
only with bare rationality, the necessary means to achieve the desired 
end. It is this kind of justification which Wilfried Ver Eecke seems 
to have in mind when he says: 
It is here that as a philosopher one can only try to 
understand the painful necessity of violence to force 
needed change, without being able to approve or condemn 
this violence. 
We cannot approve, because a morally good purpose 
cannot justify bad means. We cannot condemn either. 
We can only deplore it, just as moralists do not condemn 
a just war but keep deploring it.6 
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For Ver Eecke the ability to 11 approve or condemn this violence 11 implies 
the possibility of moral considerations and justifications which he 
reasons are impossible in the face of the 11 necessity of violence to 
force needed change. 11 The arguments to be discussed here base their 
· justifications not on the expedience or 11 necessity 11 of violence but 
on those moral considerations from which Ver Eecke could derive no 
satisfactory answer. 
These arguments concern themselves generally with the justifi-
cation for social or political ends of violence by members of a 
society. They do not confine themselves to the question of violence 
against the ruler" or rulers of a country. This is, however, a class 
of violent actions which falls within the general scope of their 
justifications. It is therefore proper to ask how the justifications 
stand in relation to this question. To accomplish this we will divide 
the arguments into three groups in order to examine them more care-
fully. It should be understood at this point that no attempt has been 
made to include all the justifications of citizen violence to be found 
in the literature. The arguments included here are both interesting 
and enlightening individually and also good representatives of a~ 
of argument to be found in the literature. There are certainly others 
which could be added to these. 
The arguments in the first group are direct descendants of those 
of Mariana, Suarez and others of the 16th and 17th centuries. In these 
arguments the justification for citizen violence is based on the notion 
that in order to have an obligation to the government or the law 
members of the society must have agreed or given their consent either 
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to the government itself, in some theories, or to the acts and policies 
of the government, in other theories, or some combination or refinement 
of these conditions. A sub-category of these arguments, wherein the 
consent of the people is discussed in more or less legal language, 
becomes the so-called "contract" theories of government. But not all 
of the contemporary writers who talk in terms of the consent of the 
governed waul d commit themselves to this 1 anguage of "contracts" and 
.. covenants." So the more general heading of "consent". arguments will be 
used for this group. 
Aquinas' view that God's law is higher than civil or man-made law, 
that one has no obligation to obey the ruler when he commands what 
contradicts the higher law, provides a very clear example of the type 
of justification in the second group.? One should qualify this by 
pointing out that Aquinas did not believe that common citizens had the 
right to actively resist a ruler who contradicted God's law, the right 
of resistance was restricted to those in positions of authority under 
the ruler, but the idea that there are obligations over and above 
those of maintaining the civil law is the basis for several contemp-
orary defenses of citizen violence.8 The "higher law" to which man is 
obligated may be one determining the fulfillment of his own nature or 
essence; it may be what one might call the continuing evolution of 
history or liberation of man, a notion especially prevelant in the 
Marxists; or the higher law may be an overriding moral principle or 
system of moral obligations. Each of these is used in one of the argu-
ments to be discussed under the heading of "higher law' justifications. 
The third group of justifications discussed are quite clearly 
based on the principle of utility. These are not simply arguments 
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from expediency, i.e. that whatever is necessary for the desired end is 
allowable. A basic principle of the arguments is to do that which 
produces the greatest amount of happiness possible in the society. 
The careful calc.ulation of the outcome of an action in terms of 
h~ppiness versus unhappiness and the special concern for the possible 
future effects of violence distinguish these arguments from those of 
mere expediency. 
Once the .vadous a·m~umen:ts a·re Sltiffici ently clear with r.ega·r.d to 
the assumptions on which they rest, the claims they are making, and 
the reasoning by which they reach them, then they can be applied to 
our more specific question of violence against rulers and the justifi-
cation thereof. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE "CONSENP ARGUMENTS 
Of the three arguments to be discussed in this chapter, that by 
John Rawls is probably the most explicit in grounding its premises in 
the consent of the people. It is in Rawls' argument, in fact, "the 
people" who determine the ideal principles of justice and thereby give 
their consent to them; this is accomplished from the special vantage 
point of the "original position" about which more will need to be said. 
Unlike Rawls whose argument encompasses a large scale theory of 
social justice, Lisa Perkins Newton is concerned in her paper only to 
establish the existence of the right of revolution. She argues that 
it is "the people" who decide on the legitimacy of their government, 
that is to say, they consent to the rule or the existence of that 
particular government. Because Newtons' argument is more limited in 
aim and because it is the more unsatisfactory of the two on the 
question of ruler killing we will look first at her justification of 
the right of revolution and then at Rawls' argument and his comments 
on what he calls "militant resistance." 
The third and final argument in this chpater is from Ted 
Honderich's book Political Violence. In the chapter "Democratic 
Violence," where we find Honderich's discussion of citizen violence, he 
does not argue for consent as a basic premise of government so much as 
assume it. His argument in this chapter is concerned with the 
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justification of citizen violence in a democracy. The previous chapter 
in the book contains a detailed criticism of John Rawls' theory of 
social justice and because of this, because Honderich may have seen his 
argument as an answer or a corrective to Rawls, we will take up this 
argument after considering Rawls. 
Ruler Killing as Part of a Right of Revolution 
In the article·titled 11 Dimensions of a Right of Revo1ution, 11 Lisa 
Perkins Newton intends to show that the right of revolution is a simple 
consequence of the conditions required for calling a government 
11 good ... l ·The right of revolution is therefore justified as being an 
inevitable consequence of any 11 good 11 system of government. Her defi-
nition of revolution is this: 
... an uprising of a part of the population of a nation 
with the avowed objective of destroying the present govern-
ment and replacing it with another government. This 
definition holds regardless of the percentage of the 
population involved in the revolution ... regardless of 
the projected fate of the present governors---death, exile, 
or simply acquiescence---and regardless of the projected 
replacement government . . . 2 
The definition explicitly allows ruler killing and thus proposes to 
justify this act, when a part of a revolution, as a right under all 
good governments. 
Because, she says, anarchism is the viewpoint from which one might 
most reasonably expect a justification of the right of revolution, 
Newton begins her argument with a critical discussion of the philosophy 
of anarchism. She finds two propositions basic to the anarchist 
position. 
Each individual has a prima facie right to make his own 
decisions in matters of conduct. 
12 
It is not the case that any individual, group or institution 
can have the authority to im~ose decisions in matters of 
conduct upon any individual. 
Proposition P2 might be restated as, "There is no legitimate au-
thority," or "There is no such thing as a legitimate government." 
Since, however, by her definition revolution consists not only of 
overthrowing one government but of replacing it with another, the right 
of revolution would seem to be contrary to the second proposition of 
anarchism. 
The right /of revolution/ which we set ourselves to ex-
plicate, it should be noted, has two parts: first, the 
right of the people "to alter or to abolish" the existing 
government when it becomes destructive of its proper ends 
(i.e. loses its legitimacy), and second, the right of the 
people "to institute new government. 11 The first part is 
admirably covered in the anarchist philosophy, but the 
second is in direct conflict with Pz above. Any "new 
government" instituted would be as 1llegitimate as the 
one just overthorwn, even if the new qovernment was made 
up of none but purebred anarchists.4 -
So the right of revolution seems to require the contradictory of the 
second proposition which would be: "There are (objectively deter-
minable) conditions under which an individual, group, or institution 
has the authority to impose decisions in matters of conduct upon 
individuals."5 This statement Newton calls P2'. 
But now it looks as though P1 and P2' are incompatible, since 
P1 asserts that the indivudual has a prima facie right to decide 
his own conduct and P2' asserts that an institution or government can 
have such a right to decide conduct. The incompatibility can be 
resolved, however, if we notice that the right to determine one's 
conduct, in P1, is only a prima facie right, i.e. it can be over-
ridden by other more important considerations. Though Newton does not 
deal with this point explicitly, her references to John Locke in this 
part of the article give us a clue as to her reasoning.6 Here she 
seems to be of the opinion (with Locke) that men give up certain 
rights which were originally their own (prima facie rights) in order 
to enjoy the benefits of society. She says, "When the government 
attempts to confiscate the property of the people, or otherwise 
overteps its legal bounds, it actually gives up the power the people 
gave to it. . u] Giving up certain rights in favor of the judgment 
of society is not incompatible with having had those rights in the 
first place. Though she rejects Locke's account of the right of 
revolution because it "depends on a fiction, if that is what it is, 
of a social contract" his thought seems to have influenced her view 
on the individual's prima facie rights.8 
But given that some governments do have legitimate authority the 
question arises as to who decides when the government is legitimate. 
I 
There are two immediate possibilities: those inside the government 
(the rulers), or those outside the government (the peopl~). Since a 
government's declaring itself to be illegitimate is both logically 
questionable and, practically speaking, unlikely, the judgment is 
left to the people. This right of judgment of legitimacy Newton 
specifies in proposition P3. Stating the three prppositions 
in order and using the reduced form of P2 ' we have: 
P1: Each individual has a prima facie right to make his own 
decisions in matters of conduct. 
P2 1 : There are conditions under which government is legitimate. 
P3: The right to decide whether these conditions exist belungs 
to the people. 
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Newton claims, correctly I think, that these three assertions are 
sufficient to establish the right of revolution ~general; she 
concedes that the justifiability of any particular revolution is open 
to challenge. Though she has not established the truth of the 
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assertions, they do seem to entail the right of revolution as she 
phrases it. But her original claim was that these same propositions 
are also the grounds for any good government, and if she could show 
this her assertion of the real existence of a right of revolution would 
be much more plausible. 
11 Good government .. is defined by Newton as: 
First. the existence of some associative form for the 
making of collective decisions (government), and second, 
the avoidance on the part of that association of deci-
sions and other instruments which would result in the 
crushing of the individual .9 
But besides characterizing .. good governnient, .. the above definition is 
claimed to be a direct consequence of assertions P1 and P1 above. 
This conjuction /the two parts of the definition of good 
governmen!f, the-logical consequence of P1 and P2 above, is 
the logical starting point for Mill's discussion of the 
limits of authority of society over the individual. (On 
Liberty, Chapter IV) Having granted the value of government 
on other grounds, Mill is simply spelling out, in that 
discussion, what it is for a government to be good. P3 
is both the necessary condition for the persistence in faTd 
of good government, and the collective translation of P1. 
The definition or requirements for good government are therefore ulti-
mately connected to the same grounds as the right of revolution, and 
Newton's somewhat stronger claim is that any good government logically 
requires that the right of revolution exists. As a clarification of 
this 11 right of revolution, 11 Newton distinguishes three sets of· 
consequences which follow from it. 
The first set relates to assertion P2' above and is concerned with 
the legitimacy of the new government; 
Thus it fo 11 ows from a right of revo 1 uti on that the 
government instituted by the revolutionaries is legiti-
mate, its legitimacy subject, of course, to the same 
limits as the one they overthrew.ll 
This is an obvious result of the definition given for the right of 
revolution. 
The second set of consequences relates directly to our question 
about ruler killing. Since, Newton says, we have a general principle 
which requires that 11Who wills the end, must also will the necessary 
means, 11 and since the people have a right to judge and to depose any 
government they find to be illegitimate, they murt have both the 
necessary means to judge the government intell ig1ently and the means 
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to depose it if it is found wanting.l2 The first of these means are 
none other than the familiar freedoms contained in our 11 Bill of Rights_.1 
If the people are to make the correct decision about their 
government, they must have access to abundant information 
about it, they must be able to gather together and talk 
over the issues in public debate or private conversation 
without interference, they must be able to find out which 
of any injustices they may discover are remediable without 
rev9l~tion. Thus th~ f~~edom~ of ~peech, press, a~sembly~ 
, petttion and a general r1ght of pr1vacy are. establ1shed.l 
This is a rather novel but nonetheless interesting way to go about the 
justification of these freedoms. The second kind of means. the means 
to depose the existing government, is more relevant to our study. 
Further, it is highly likely that any revolution will 
require violence on the part of the revolutionaries; 
failing an absolute prohibition of violence, which we do 
not find in the tradition and have no reason to introduce 
here, violence must be allowed as a means where 
necessary .14 
We have then as a consequence of the right of revolution a justification 
of the use of violence, including the assassination of rulers. Once 
again, however, this justification is only applicable to violence in 
general. the use of violence or assissination in any particular case 
is very much open to argument. 
16 
Although she,does not state it explicitly, it may be possible to 
derive' from what Newton has said somewhat more specific circumstances 
which would justify killing the ruler. The second clause of her 
definitioR of 11 good government 11 prohibits 11 decisions and other 
instruments ~hich would result in the crushing of the. individual. 11 By 
11 the crushing of the i;ndividual 11 she presumably means taking his 1 ife 
and/or violating those rights which he has not forfeited to the society. 
From this, then. we can derive at least one general condition under 
which the government would become i 11 egitimate, i.e. when it 11 crushes 11 
the individual. and at which time violence against the ruler would be 
a possibly justifiable action. But the ruler is himself an individual 
with the same rights as his citizens. It would seem, therefore, that 
only in a case in which the ruler cannot be removed from power in any 
other way is his assassination justifiable. Violent resistance on 
his part to remain in office. for example, would seem to be one of 
the only cases in which ruler killing would be justifiable. 
Newton devotes considerable attention to the third set of conse-
quences of a right of revolution which arise from questions about 
how many people make up a revolution, and when does the government 
have a right to resist. Because we are not concerned in this study 
with theories of revolution as such we will not follow out in detail 
the reasoning Newton uses to arrive at her answers to these admittedly 
important questions. Let it suffice to say that Newton concludes that 
the support of a bare majority of the active (i.e. capable of 
governihg) citiiehs is the minimum number sufficient to constitute a 
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revolution .15 
But perhaps the next most obvious question to a rise here and one 
to which Newton does not address herself is "What are the objective 
criteria on which the people judge the legitimacy of the existing 
government?" Newton, understandably, does not deal with the question 
because it is beyond the scope of her argument. But the question is 
relevant for our study because it bears on the justification of partic-
ular acts of violence in a revolutionary situation. One could answer 
that it makes no difference what criteria the people use because once 
they decide to depose a government the revolution is legitimate anyway; 
it is always their right to stage a revolution. But on the other hand, 
morality seems to require that the destruction and death associated 
with revolution be weighed against the evil in the existing government. 
Admittedly, this balancing process goes beyond simply establishing the 
right of revolution to attempting a moral justification of it. 
How well does Newton's argument for the right of revolution, 
which includes ruler killing, satisfy the three requirements we have 
set up for moral justifications? Political assassination was included 
by definition in the right of revolution so the justification of this 
more general action will to some extent also justify the specific acts 
it includes. In justifying the right of revolution Newton recognizes 
that this right must also be related to a more general principle in 
order to justify it. This she attempts to do by deriving the right 
of revolution from the three principles P1, P2', and P3. These 
principles are themselves fairly reasonable, as Newton demonstrates by 
comparing them with the alternatives. But the final claim, that these 
three principles constitute a characterization of any good government, 
seems to be altogether too strong. One can understand wanting to 
establish such a connection since the result would be as Newton says: 
11 • • • the same assertions !J , P •, and P'J! are nothing 
other than the conditions for 1gooB government in general, 
and therefore revolution may not be condemned in general 
by those who would advocate good government.ul6 
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But even given Newton•s own definition of 11 good government, .. it is not 
clear that this definition is the 11 logical outcome 11 of the three prin-
ciples stated above. Some additional explanation might have helped 
but we are given only the reference to Mill. Despite not clearly 
establishing this final connection the argument as a whole does a 
reasonable job of relating the act of ruler killing to more general 
actions and then to moral principles. 
On the second point, however, that of accounting for conflicts 
with other moral principles, Newton has very little to say. In 
principle P1 we find that people are to have a prima facie right to 
decisions about their own conduct but the conditions (referred to in 
P2•) which justify overriding these prima facie rights are not further 
specified. We have attempted to derive some explanation from Newton•s 
references to Locke and to her definition of 11 good government 11 but 
these efforts could not take us very far. Such contrary claims might 
have important practical consequences since, for example, some might 
consider political stability to be sufficiently important to override 
autonomy in a majority of cases. Considerations of political stability 
are also important in relation to principle P3. Even though, given 
the choice between the ruler or the people deciding whether the govern-
ment is legitimate reason gives this power to the people, reason might 
also question whether the people•s decision that a government is bad 
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or illegitimate is a sufficient justification for overthrowing it. 
Newton does not want to argue that because a government is judged 
illegitimate the people have a duty to overthrow it. She specifically 
limits her discussion to "rights" rather than 11duties. 11 17 But surely 
a way of considering the possible effects of a violent revolution as 
well as, a more deta i 1 ed account of 11 1 egitimacy" waul d be necessary 
in a complete account of a sufficient justification. 
As we have said, it was obviously beyond the scope of Newton's 
article to include a detailed discussion of the objective characteris-
tics by which the people are to judge the legitimacy of a government, 
or the characteristics of a justifiable revolution. But if ruler 
killing is to be justified on the basis of a general right of revolu-
tion these conditions of legitimacy would need to be examined and 
specified more fully. 
We seem to· find, then, in this first argument the beginnings of 
what might be developed into a complete justification for ruler 
killing. The next argument is able to satisfy the second and third 
requirements for jus tifi cation much more fully. 
Citizen Violence and the Two 
Principles of Justice 
At the end of the section titled 11 The Definition of Civil Disobe-
dience11 in his !l Theory of Justice, John Rawls says, ''Now in certain 
circumstances militant action and other kinds of resistance are surely 
justified. I shall not, however, consider these cases.ul8 In the 
sections which follow this statement Rawls gives the qualifying 
criteria for those acts which, in conjunction with the rest of his 
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theory of 11 justice as fairness.~~ constitutes his justification of civil 
disobedience. It is not necessary to examine his .definition of civil 
disobedience except to note that for Rawls acts of civil disobedience 
are non-violent and thus are 11 Clearly distinct from militant action 
and obstruction. 11 19 We have seen from the quotation above that Rawls 
thinks some acts of citizen violence are justified. So, following the 
pattern of his own justification for civil disobedience, it may be 
possible to apply his contract conception of justice to the problem of 
citizen violence against a ruler to discover how this act of violence 
might be justified in his theory. 
The basis on which the two principles of justice as fairness rests 
and therefore the basis of Rawls justification of civil disobedience 
and our own derivation of his views on citizen violence is what he 
calls the 11 orginal position ... 
In justice as fairness the original position of equality 
corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory 
of the social contract. This original position is not, of 
course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, 
much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is under-
stood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as 
to lead to a certain conception of justice. Among the essen-
tial features of this situation is that no 'One knows his 
place in society, his class position or social status, nor 
does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural 
assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the 
like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their 
conceptions of the good or their special psychological 
propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind 
a veil of ignorance. This insures that no one is advantaged 
or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome 
of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.20 
Without tracing his argument in detail it can be said that Rawls 
asserts that the persons in the original position would arrive at two 
principles of social justice. Though they are considerably refined in 
Rawls later examination of them, at their initial appearance they are 
stated thus: 
... the first requires equality in the assignment of 
basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social 
and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of 
wealth and authority, are just only if they result in 
compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for 
the least advantaged members of society.Zl 
With several important qualifications, Rawls finds Civil disobedience 
to be justified in a well-ordered society when it contributes to a 
fuller realization of social justice as embodied in the two rules and 
when the acts are in compliance with the two rules of justice. Its 
justification .is grounded on the fairness of the 110riginal position. 11 
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In the same way, the derivation for the justification of citizen 
violence is grounded on the original position through the two princi-
ples of justice. And in the same way, only those acts which contribute 
to a fuller realization of the two rules and are in compliance with 
them could be justifiable. First we must decide if the act of killing 
a ruler could meet these two major requirements, then the further 
qualifications which Rawls makes on acts of civil disobedience can 
be examined in turn. 
When we come to apply Rawls• discussion of civil disobedience to 
the question of ruler killing there are two cases to be considered. 
The cases are violence occurring in what Rawls calls a well-ordered 
society or in a society which is not well-ordered. He describes a 
well-ordered society this way:· 
Now let us say that a society is well-ordered when it 
is not only designed to advpnce the good of its members 
but when it is also effectively regulated by a public 
conception of justice. That is, it is a society in which 
(l) everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the 
same principles of justice, and (2) the basic social 
institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to 
satisfy these principles.22 · 
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The problem of ruler killing will be considered in relation to the 
two types of societies separately since the distinction between the 
society that is well-ordered and that which is not is important for our 
analysis. 
In discussing citizen violence we are of course speaking of 
societies which are not ideal realizations of Rawls' two principles 
of justice. The non-ideal applications occupy less of Rawls' attention 
in his book than does the ideal theory itself~ but he does discuss 
some applications of ideal theory to non-ideal circumstances such as 
those which give rise to civil disobedience and conscientious refusal. 
On the other hand, the well-ordered society as it is discussed here 
is not to be thought of as the ideal society, if it were there would 
be no need for violence. The society is well-ordered in that it has 
a generally shared conception of justice but it is non-ideal in that 
there' 1s not a·lways f.leffect agreement as to how this conceptton is ·to 
be realized. In this way we allow for the possibility of injustice 
and the need for its rectification even in the well-ordered society. 
Rawls• first qualificatinn when considering civil disobedience as 
a means for social change is that the condition to be protested is one 
of injustice in the society and not simply an undesirable condition 
resulting from natural circumstances . 
. . . a restriction Z9f liberti,T can derive from the natural 
limitations and accidents of human life, or from historical 
and social contingencies. The question of the justice of 
these constraints does not arise. For example, even in a 
well-ordered society under favorable circumstances, liberty 
of thought and conscience is subject to reasonable regula-
tions and the principle of participatio~ is restricted 
in extent. These constraints issue from the more or less 
permanent conditions of political life; others are adjust-
ments to the natural features of the human situation, as 
with the lesser liberty of children.23 
Such undesirable but unavoidable conditions as minor restrictions on 
freedom of speech or small inequalities in economic or social status 
are not grounds for violence because they result from the basic facts 
of association of people in societies. 
Rawls' first principle of justice maintains that basic liberties 
are to be equal for all and are to be as extensive as is compatible 
with their equality. The 11 basic 11 liberties he lists are these: 
... political liberty (the right to vote and to be 
eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech 
and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; 
freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) 
property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as 
defined by the concept of the rule of law.24 
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All other social and economic freedoms or rights (including the distri-
bution of material wealth) are to be handled under the second principle 
of justice. Rawls specifies that the two principles of justice are to 
be serially or lexically ordered: the first rule is to be satisfied 
before the second is considered and in addition, no possible gain in 
the second rule freedoms can override the claims of the basic liberties 
in the first rule i.e. equality of liberty and liberty to the greatest 
extent possible. This lexical ordering is incorporated into what Rawls 
calls the Priority Rule: 
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical 
order and therefore 1 i berty can be restricted only for the 
sake of liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less ex-
tensive liberty must strengthen the total system of 
liberty shared by all, and (b) a less than equal liberty 
must be acceptable to those citizens with the lesser 
1 i berty. 25 
For example, no degree of economic wealth for the entire society can 
justify the abridgement of the freedoms of speech, conscience, or 
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personal property. 
In relating this to the problem of citizen violence in the well-
ordered society it is evident that as a method of rectifying injustice, 
the justifiability of ruler killing will depend on the seriousness of 
the injustice. If the injustice is that of an inequitable distribution 
of economic wealth or inequality of opportunity it falls under the 
second principle of justice and if in attempting to rectify it one 
violated any of the basic liberties under the first principle he would 
/ have broken the Priority Rule. Thus it is unjustifiable for citizens 
to assassinate, kidnap for political demands, or even to abridge 
freedom of speech or assembly in an attempt to bring about a more 
equitable arrangement of the second principle liberties. 
If, on the other hand, the injustice is one involving the basic 
liberties of the first principle the outcome is somewhat different. 
First of all, it seems that a society in which there is serious 
abridgement of the basic liberties might not be considered well-
ordered, since one of the criteria for being a well-ordered society 
was that it was 11 designed to advance the good of its members. 11 At the 
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very least this society is on the borderline between those that can be 
called well-ordered and those that cannot. Though the label itself 
makes little difference, we will find that for this society and those 
that are definitely not well-ordered the range of justifiable acts is 
wider. The injustices in these societies are serious enough that the 
I 
question of ruler killing arises as a possible moral consideration. 
The society that is not designed for the good of its members and 
where there is no shared conception of justice is one in which we are 
likely to find gross injustices, possibly systematically perpetuated, 
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for example on the basis of class distinctions, or on the social con-
flicts arising from the 11might makes right 11 ethic. In these societies 
there may be no general recognition of the 11 basic liberties 11 of the 
individual and certainly no conception of justice as detailed as Rawls' 
two principles. Of course even in this society where they are, unrecog-
nized, the two principles of justice (with the Priority Rule) exist as 
goals to be worked toward and to a certain extent as guides for action 
in the process of their own realization. 
Because physical violence against persons is a very serious 
violation of the basic liberties, the Priority Rule requires an equally 
serious injustice to justify its use. In the well-ordered society it 
was obvious that an unjust distribution of wealth, a liberty under the 
second rule, could not justify violence to persons, a first rule 
liberty. The right to life or physical well-being, would seem to be 
lexically prior to any concern with economic or social status. Only 
in a society where these basic rights of life or physical well-being 
were systematically violated by those in power could violence to those 
persons be justified. Even here, assassination would seem to be the 
very last resort because it is such a serious breach of the basic 
liberties the citizen is trying to protect. 
It should be emphasized that an important difference between this 
reasoning about citizen violence and Rawls' own discussion of civil 
disobedience is that whereas Rawls restricts his discussion to the 
well-ordered society we found that citizen violence has no justifiable 
place in such a system and only becomes a moral possibility when the 
society is seriously unjust and thus no longer well-ordered. In the 
society which is not well-ordered, even ruler killing becomes a moral 
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possibility when the lives of the citizens are in danger. 
Keeping in mind that this is an extrapolation or derivation from 
Rawls' actual argument, it seems that a rather impressive justification 
for citizen violence and even in certain cases for ruler killing can be 
contructed. 
· The first requirement we asked of a moral justification was that 
it showed the act or group of acts in question to be 1n accord with a 
more basic moral principle. Our extrapolation of Rawls' argument shows 
that in certain seriously unjust societies even the most basic liber-
ties might have to be restricted or violated in certain individual 
cases in order for the society as a whole to enjoy these same basic 
liberties more fully. The case of killing a murderous tyrant is an 
obvious illustration. Rawls makes the basic principles to which the 
problematic acts must be accountable very explicit in his two rules of 
justice. He spells out the liberties which are to apply under each 
rule~ and he gives considerable space to an argument for the plausi-
bility of the rules as the most desireable arrangement for distributing 
social goods. Because of the explicitness of each of these steps it is 
fairly easy to show how an act of citizen violence could in the right 
circumstances relate to the basic principles of justice, thus satis-
fying the first requirement of a moral justification. 
In terms of the second requirement of justification, Rawls is once 
again very explicit as to how social goods are to be weighted in the 
system. In a case of conflict between two goods the more basic as de-
termined by the Priority Rule and the lexical ordering of the two 
principles is to be given precedence. With regard to the ordering 
of liberties in a society that is not well-ordered, such as where we 
found ruler killing might apply, however, Rawls has an interesting 
comment: 
The case for certain political liberties and the rights 
of fair equality of opportunity is less compelling. As 
I noted before, it may be reasonable to forgo part of 
these freedoms when the long run benefits are great 
enough to transform a less fortunate society into one 
where the equal liberties can be fully enjoyed. This 
is especially true when circumstances are not conducive 
to the exercise of these rights in any case. Under 
certain conditions that cannot at present be removed, 
the value of some liberties may not be so high as to 
rule out the possibility of compensation to those less 
fortunate.26 
Rawls seems to be saying that in a society that is not well-ordered 
( 11 less fortunate 11 ), where circumstances would not in any case allow 
for the full practice of first principle liberties, that it is 
possible to forgo these in favor of greater second principle social 
goods (economic wealth, etc.) which would in time bring the society 
to a place where the first principle political liberties could be 
realized. 
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Rawls admits elsewhere that even the Priority Rule will 
not be able to decide all cases of conflict between social goods.27 
The statement above, however, seems to open the door to all kinds 
of debate and argument about whether or not a particular society 
is 11 ready 11 for the full ,realization of the two principles and the 
Priority Rule, or whether primary liberties may still be restricted 
for the sake of greater secondary social goods. 28 Since our 
discussion of ruler killing is largely extrapolation from Rawls, 
and since he nowhere talks specifically about a right to life or the 
weight such a right would have in any society, the weakness we have 
discovered in the Priority Rule for just those societies where 
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this right might be most in danger is a weakness in his argument. 
Just at the point where we need to know how to weigh the ruler's 
life against those of his citizens or against their other political 
rights Rawls says the Priority Rule may not apply. On the point 
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of the second requirement for justification, Rawls' system of weighing 
social goods goes a considerable distance b.ut not quite far enough 
to give a firm answer on the question of ruler killing. 
The structure of Rawl •s argument and the way he himself handles 
the problem of civil disobedience makes it very clear what factors 
are relevant to the problems of citizen violence and ruler killing. 
The objective conditions to be considered, is the society well-
ordered or not? What rights or liberties are being violated?, 
etc., are evident from his discussion of the other problem. Thus, 
judged on the basis of the three requirements we have set up for 
a moral justification, Rawls has supplied the grounds for a fairly 
extensive and consistent justification. Except for the important 
problem we discovered with the Priority Rule in these extreme 
circumstances and the fact that Rawls does not discuss the right 
to .1 i fe as either an abso 1 ute or in terms of the 1 exi ca 1 ordering 
of the Priority Rule, we might have been able to derive a rather 
impressive justification for certain instances of ruler killing. 
Without knowing. however, how Rawls views these important factors, 
it is impossible to state with any confidence whether or not his 
argument would justify ruler killing. 
After an extremely promising beginning, Rawls' argument has led 
us into a kind of mire of pointless speculation. In the next argument 
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to be discussed, however, the author has addressed himself specifically 
to the problem of citizen violence thus,hopefully, putting our dis-
cussion on more solid ground. 
Ruler Killing and 11 0emocratic Violence 11 
The argument advanced by Ted Honderich in the third essay, 
11 DemocraticViolence, 11 of his book Political Violence is not so clearly 
based on the device of consent of the people so much as it seems to 
spring from that tradition. In the second essay in the book, 11 0n Two 
Pieces of Reasoning About an Obligation to Obey the Law, 11 he sides 
against utilitarianism. Even though he has a considerable amount of 
criticism for John Rawls 1 theory of obligation based on his two 
principles of justice, his opposition to utilitarianism and the import-
ance he gives to democracy in his own argument urges that he be 
included in this group rather than some other.29 
One of the possible arguments against citizen violence is that 
when carried out in a democracy such violence is destructive of de-
mocracy itself. If democracy is a desirab'te-form of government, and 
Honderich argues that it is. then violence is unjustifiable if it 
tends to destroy this desirable system. In this regat1d violence is 
usually seen as breaking the 11 rul es 11 of democracy, rules to which the 
people themselves have consented. Honderich 1 S argument consists in 
showing that not only is violence not necessarily contradictory to 
democracy but can in some cases be complimentary to democratic aims 
and ideals. 
In order, however, to show that some citizen violence does not 
contradict democracy, he offers a more precise description of the rules 
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which define the practice of democracy and which, he claims, are not 
broken. There are three basic rules: 1) uncoerced choosing and 
influencing of government; 2) approximate equality of opportunity in 
the choosing and influencing of government; and 3) effective majority 
decision by government.30 The rule of non-coercion applies not only 
to voters but to candidates for office and to the government after an 
election and means that none of these are in a strict sense controlled 
or forced to act in a certain direction, 11 that their attitudes, wants, 
demands and choices, both interested and in a way disinterested, are 
of their own making.n3l Honderich supplies some needed clarification 
of this concept at a later point. Relative to the rule of approxi-
mate equality of influence Honderich says: 
. . . we may recall first that democracy gives to each 
of almost all adults the possibility of one vote in the 
choice of a government, and the possibility of some part, 
not wholly out of line with the parts of others, in the 
influencing of governmennz-- · 
The third rule insures that elected representatives make decisions by 
majority vote, that no minority has special privileges of veto power, 
etc., and that the decisions of the representatives be translated 
into fact. Honderich says these rules constitute his .. impression .. of 
the practice. he has in mind when spea.king of democracy.33 
Described in terms of the three rules above, Honderich sees 
democracy as desirable for two .related reasons. These he calls the 
argument of freedom and the argument of equality. On the argument of 
freedom he says: 
It is to be noticed that democracy is not being 
recommended as denying the mentioned autonomy to an 
individual or a minority and giving it to ordinary 
people who make up the soc1ety. Such a claim is 
patently at odds with the facts. Democracy gives to 
citizens only something which can best be described briefly 
in a negative way: a circumstance in which no individual 
or minority has as much autonomy, with respect to major 
policies of the society, as have individual or minorities 
in other political practices. It gives to citizens not 
any freedom of power but rather a freedom from power.3~ 
In addition to the 11 freedom from power 11 which democracy secures there 
are other points in favor of democracy in the argument of freedom. 
There are, however, other possible autonomies which are 
in fact realized in a democracy, or realized to some 
extent. These are smaller and yet enter importantly 
into the present fundamenta 1 argument for democracy. . . . 
Some of these autonomies are integral to the practice, 
as defined, and are secured by what are known as the 
political rights. How a man will vote is within his 
decision, and his satisfaction in its being so is real. 
Others of these smaller autonomies are consequences rather 
than integral parts of the democratic practice, although 
not invariably so, and are in part secured by non-political 
rights. Here we have freedoms of culture, including re-
ligion, and freedom in the use of law.35 
Closely related to the 11argument of freedom 11 is the 11argument of 
equality. 11 
It is that in a democracy one gets certain approximations 
to equa 1 i ty. Some of them are greater approximations than 
in non-democratic societies, others are lesser approxima-
tions; These approaches to equality, full realizations of 
equality in several instances, are to be found in the demo-
cratic practice itself and also in its customary 
consequences.36 · 
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Though he does not elaborate the arguments in great detail they are 
simple enough and common enough to make the necessary point in his 
argument, i.e. that if democracy is desirable then in whatever manner 
violence conflicts with or destroys democracy it is prima facie 
unjustified, and if in some ways violence not only does not contradict 
democracy but could aid a system to be more democratic then on these 
grounds at least this violence would be prima·facie justifed. 
Honderich makes no more than this very limited claim against the 
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notion that violence is always contradictory to democracy. 
The kind of violence which Honderich has in mind he calls 11 demo-
cratic violence ... He gives several ways in which democratic violence 
avoids breaking the rules he stated for democracy and in fact furthers 
the ends of democracy. To show how democratic violence avoids breaking 
the rule of noncoerced choosing and influencing, he divides coercion 
into two types: coercion of force and coercion of persuasion. One 
example he gives of coercion of force is giving up one's wallet at the 
point of a gun.37 Of all the cases of coercion of this type he says: 
They are alike in that they offer but a single possibility 
and hence that there is no room for effectual reflection 
and judgement. As a consequence of this, although the 
fact is of secondary importance to us. I am absolved 
from a certain responsibility in each case.38 
In coercion of persuasion, on the other hand, 11 I am 1 eft room for 
effectual reflection and judgement ... He gives as an example, 11my 
giving an unwilling donation to a dubious charity when I believe that 
the collector will mention a refusal to my employer, who is in favor 
of the charity ... 39 Recognizing that the distinction between the two 
types of coercion is at this point very crude and leaves many examples 
of coercion somewhere between the two extremes, Honderich nevertheless 
claims that coercion of persuasion does not break the rule of democracy 
concerning 11 Uncoerced choosing and influencing ... 
The practice of democracy is such that it is possible for 
minorities and interest groups to exert pressure on the 
electorate. These pressures sometimes stand in analogy 
with those persuasions of individuals mentioned above. 
They sometimes evoke moral responses and sometimes evoke 
responses of prudence, but not what we may call enforced 
prudence. It is. hardly too much to say that the democratic 
practice has at its bottom the coercion of persuasion. The 
electorate is restrained or constrained, but in such a way 
that it is left room for r~fJection. The same is true for 
candidates and governments.40 
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The final step here obviously is the claim that some violence (demo-
cratic violence) is not, as it would seem, a case of coercion of force 
but of coercion of persuasion. By way of example Honderich offers: 
Governments, to speak first of them, are left room for 
effectual reflection and decision in the face of this 
violence. The American government was not forced, by acts 
of violence, to enter into a more vigorous policy against 
racial discrimination and racism. It was certainly not 
forced by violence, although the point takes us out of the 
area of our primary concern, to change its policy of war in 
Vietnam. The British government was not forced to take 
seriously the demands of the oppressed minority in Ulster . 
. . The case is similar with electorates and with candidates. 
With few exceptions, they are not forced into their policiP.s 
by violence or forced into particular political behavior.41 
While admitting that an act of violence can be coercion of force for an 
individual, the same act in the broader scope of its effect upon 
electorates and governments is not force but persuasion, and persuasion 
is, as he has pointed out, almost fundamental in the workings of 
democracy. 
Violence quite obviously breaks in many instances the second rule 
of democracy, that of approximate equality of influence. 
The criterion of democracy that each citizen has one vote 
is important only because we assume something about the 
efficacy of the election. It is not unreasonable to con-
clude, perhaps, that a certain level of violence in a 
society, since it somewhat reduces the relative efficacy 
of voting, is in some conflict with the criterion of 
'one man, one vote.•42 
But Honderich also has in mind here by the term 'influence' the power 
to make one's political attitudes and inclinations felt in government, 
and in this regard he notes: 
Of the individuals who do not engage in violence, as we 
have noticed, there are some who enjoy very great favour-
able inequalities of influence. That is, wealth and 
position give to some considerable number of individuals 
a far greater influence than is had by almost all of those 
individuals who are without wealth or position. Let us 
compare, then, the group of the violent and the group of 
the privileged. It is plain enough that the violent may 
be seen as attempting to secure an equal influence or 
something like it.4~ 
Seen in this way acts of democratic violence not only do not violate 
the rule of equality of influence but may in fact be an attempt to 
enforce the rule and thus make the system more democratic than pre-
viously. 
Even granting that violence at least above a certain limit is in 
conflict with the third rule of democracy, i.e. effective majority 
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dec is ion, there are s ti 11 enough simi 1 a riti es and convergences between 
the practice of democracy and some kinds of violence to warrant 
consideration of the category "democratic violence ... A similarity 
which Honderich discusses before the others but which is, I think, 
more plausible after his discussions of coercion and equality of 
influence is that of the ends of democracy and violence. 
It can be said for some political violence that it serves 
the ends of freedom, or equality, or both. One may argue 
for, although not necessarily justify, such violence as 
serving the ends which are also the ends of the practi~e 
of democracy, a practice which by definition is non-violent. 
Thus the fundamental arguments for the practice of demo-
cracy may also be used in defense of some political 
violence.44 
He sums up his findings thus: 
Violence, then, may serve the ends which are fundamental 
to the democratic practice. Secondly, it may, as coercion 
share an attribute with procedures that are intrinsic to 
democratic systems. It cannot be said without dismay and 
apprehension, but it is to be said that some bombs are like 
votes. Thirdly, this violence is by one comparison an 
attempt to gain equality of influence. Fourthly, it is 
not directed to the ending of democratic systems.~ It may, 
finally, lead to their becoming more democratic.4~ 
Honderich never claims to have given a sufficient justification 
for even this special category "democratic violence ... He says: 
I have said that it seems to me that at least some 
violence has a moral justification, but I have not done 
anything like show this. It will be clear, I trust, that 
I do not suppose that the proposition that some violence 
has a justification can be derived from the fact alone that 
it is in the given sense democratic.46 
Though his argument may not be sufficient as a justification it is an 
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important argument nonetheless. But for the natural reticence to claim 
to have solved a problem when there are certainly still difficulties 
in one•s argument he might have made his claim somewhat stronger. He 
does for example seem to view his conclusions as rather important when, 
in discussing the convergence of ends of violence and democracy, he 
says: 
The fact about ends is a considerable one, partly be-
cause the ends in question are not external to the demo-
cratic practice but internal to it. They inform the 
practice and are fundamenta 1 to its character. Furthermore, 
although the question is a large one, it may be argued that 
it is uniquely the democratic practice that is effectively 
directed toward both these ends. It is not as if some 
violence were directed toward ends of democracy, but ends 
not of its nature, or directed to ends of ge.mocracy clearly 
shared with other practices of government . . ]. 
In spite of the qualifications on his conclusion, Honderich clearly 
thinks that the notion of ,.democratic violence,. is an important aid 
in specifying which acts of political violence are morally justified. 
But what would the 11 rules of democracy 11 say about our specific 
problem of violence against a ruler? Could such an act qualify as 
11 democratic violence? 11 First of all, it would seem that such an act 
vilolates the rule of uncoerced choosing and influencing. Violence 
against the ruler is certai.nly coercion of force rather than Of persua-
sian when applied directly to the powerful individuals in the govern-
ment. Killing elected representatives or the president, for example, 
in a democracy does not persuade but forces the government to take 
certain actions. Speaking of violence on this individual level 
Honderich says: 
A man whose shop is destroyed by a fire or a bomb, or a 
man who abandons his shop in the face of the direct threat 
of fire or bomb, is subjected to the coercion of force. 
Such facts, and alSo the facts of injury and death, must 
enter into reflection and count against violence. It 
remains true that governments are not subjected to the 
coercion of force by such acts .48 
But insofar as presidents or elected representatives are the govern-
ment, violence directed against them as individuals is coercion of 
force on the government just as the bomb was coercion of force on the 
shopkeeper. Violence against rulers is not undemocratic coercion of 
force against the electorate as a whole but against the government 
itse 1 f. 
Because of the enormous influence which immediately attaches to 
those who kill or threaten to kill elected representatives, such acts 
clearly violate the rule of approximate equality of influence. Even 
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in instances where the violence is an attempt by a seriously disadvan-
taged or underrepresented group to gain more equal influence in the 
government the shift of such great power to a small group seems to 
be obviously contrary to democracy at least in its immediate effects. 
In relation to the third rule of democracy also it is difficult 
to see how such a serious act as killing the ruler could escape a 
charge of being destructive of democracy. Speaking of violence in 
relation to this rule of 11 effective majority decision by government 11 
Honderich states: 
The last criterion of the group is that governmental de-
cisions are effective, and hence that the rule of law 
prevails. Here, it is even more difficult to judge pre-
cisely. The principle difficulty is that of setting an 
upper limit on violence, beyond which violence is in 
substantial conflict with democracy.~9 
The idea of an upper limit to violence is very important here, for it 
seems that in general for all the rules of democracy this particular 
act of (ruler killing) surpasses the permissable upper limit and 
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therefore fa·.lls outside of Honderich 1 S category 11democratic violence. 11 
But a question then arises as to ruler killing in non-democratic 
systems or systems democratic in name only~ Though his focus is on 
violence in democracies, Honderich does consider in passing acts of 
violence in systems that do not practice fully the three rules of 
democracy. 
Historically speaking, democratic systems have not always 
advanced progress toward the ends of freedom and equality. 
They have sometimes impeded that progress. This has had 
to do, in part, with permanent minorities, non-accredited 
groups in pluralist systems, and the failure of democratic 
governments to respond to the intensity of distress, as 
distinct from its extent. It is an obvious fact that 
democracy has not always served progress toward the ends 
for Blacks in America and Catholics in the province of 
Ulster. This has been a question of some of the forms of 
freedom and some of the forms of equality. Also, of course, 
considerable impediments to progress have been raised by 
undemocratic means.50 
Democracies as well as non-democracies have poor records in the reali-
zation of the ends which they espouse. 
There inevitably is the proposition, then, that precisely 
the fundamental arguments for the practice of democracy 
can also be used to support departures from it. The ends 
which are thought to be served by the rules of democracy 
are at least sometimes served by the breaking of the rules. 
. . . . It can be argued that in some cases the O_l1_lY 
infractions which do effectively serve the ends OTCfemo-
cracy are acts of political violence. The argument is in 
part that nothing else will work, or that nothing else will 
work in a reasonable time.5~ 
This answer seems in danger of throwing the whole question of moral 
justification back to whatever is necessary to realize the ends of 
freedom and equality. Such an answ~r is, as we have said previously, 
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unsatisfactory. It virtually ignores the second and third requirements 
for moral justification, the ordering of rules and criteria of judg-
ment, and makes too weak a connection between the action and a positive 
moral rule to satisfy the first requirement. If Honderich wishes to 
make the justification stronger it is not clear how he would do it. 
Except for this rather puzzling comment, he limits himself very care-
fully to discussing citizen violence in terms of democracy . 
. . . I have not pointed to similarity between the demo-
cratic practice and one kind of political violence, 
democratic violence, only in order to establish the fact 
of similarity. Rather it has been my intention to bring 
into clearer view something that will make less difficult 
our judgement of political violence. It seems true that in 
considering problematic behavior, it is a great advantage 
if we can see clearly its relations to unproblematic 
behavior. . . . 
Some political violence has features that are shared 
with the practice of democracy, and that practice has a 
large recommendation. These are facts of which we are 
morally obliged to .take account. We have in them one 
significant bridge between facts about our societies, the 
facts of inequality, and substantial conclusions about 
political violence.52 
Without claiming to supply answers in all possible circumstances, 
Honderich shows that some political violence can be in a general 
sense in accord with demotratic practices. It is also clear that in a 
sys tern patterned on Honderi ch • s rules for democracy and in which his 
democratic ends (freedom and equality) are to a reasonable extent 
realized physical violence against elected representatives, the 
11 rulers 11 in this case, is unjustifiable. 
In summary, Honderich•s justification does not extend as far as 
ruler killing in a democracy. In terms of the three requirements for 
a justification, his defense of citizen violence is strong on the first 
and third criteria but comparitively weak on the second. 
Honderich's argument that citizen violence can in fact make a 
system of government more democratic and that democracy itself is 
des i rab 1 e by the arguments of equa 1 ity and freedom is h.i s way of 
satisfying the first requirement, i.e. that the action be shown to 
be supportive of a mora 1 rule. Within the 1 imited scope of his argu-
ment this part of the justification seems to be adequate. The role 
which violence can play in making a system more democratic is related 
39 
also to the fulfillment of the third requirement, that of generalizing 
an action or giving objective criteria for it. The criteria by which 
we judge violence as justified or not are the three rules of democracy, 
and though these would certainly not be specific enough in every case 
we hav~ been able to disallow some acts of violence, e.g. ruler 
killing, for not satisfying these three rules. 
Honderich's justification is weakest, however, in the area of the 
second criteria, specifying the weight this moral argument is to have 
when opposed to other moral rules or obligations. Honderich does not 
attempt to resolve the obvious conflicts between citizen violence and 
other moral rules. That he recognizes the importance of the conflicts 
can be seen from this statement: 
If some bombs are like votes, they also maim and kill. 
The deprivation and degradation that call up violence 
should never be absent from thought and feeling, and 
not so presP.nt in them as to obscure other terrible 
realities .53 
It may not be entirely fair to criticize this part of his justification 
when he quite conscientiously points out the difficulty himself. But 
in spite of the obvious difficulty of such an ordering of moral 
principles, it is true nevertreless that a complete justification is 
not possible without answering the claims of these other principles. 
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Any attempt at justification is crippled unless one can somehow put the 
claims in a reasonable order. 
We have seen that in general for Honderich ruler killing could not 
be justifieq ~~democracy. He does not address himself at length to 
the circumstances of an undemocratic system. Without knowing what 
weight to give general moral prohibitions against killing, etc., it is 
impossible to say whether Honderich would regard ruler killing in 
undemocratic systems as justifiable or not. In these systems the three 
rules would, of course, not apply, and since it was on the basis of 
these practices that we disallowed ruler killing in a democracy the 
question seems to be left open as far as these other systems are 
concerned. 
The three arguments which we have examined in this chapter are 
somewhat dissimilar in their approaches to the justification problem. 
Their opinions on the question of ruler killing are also dissimilar. 
Because of these individual differences we will forego any comparison 
among them until the last chapter of this paper. In that final chapter 
we can more profitably compare them individually rather than as a group 
with the arguments yet to be discussed. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE "HIGHER LAW" ARGUMENTS 
In none of the arguments in this chapter do we find an explicit 
statement of a "higher law" as the ultimate principle on which the 
argument is grounded. What we have instead are justifications grounded 
on the importance o: a certain concept or idea like "human rights.'' My 
assumption in calling these "higher law" arguments is that the regard 
in which the concept is held can be characterized by combining the 
concept and its importance for the argument in an ethical statement 
like, "Human rights are to be protected." Even though, as I said, none 
of the writers discussed here frames his basic concept in quite this 
way, such a transformation does not affect the structure or substance 
of the argument, and it makes clear the connection these arguments bear 
to numerous historical and contemporary defenses of political diso-
bedience. 
Citizen Violence and Human Rights 
Henry David Aiken's justification of citizen violence rests on the 
notion of "human rights." In his discussion of the political philos-
ophy he calls "liberalism proper" he distinguishes three interlocking 
classes of rights: 1) "the rights of enlightenment" he describes as 
those pertaining to the development and exercise of a sense of human 
responsibility" including rights to moral education, the formation of 
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independent judgment, free inquiry, thought, speech, etc.; 2) 11mater-
ial rights,.~ to life, to the liberty required to protect it, and to the 
economic conditions to sustain it; and 3) 11 rights pertaining to the 
inner life, .. to religious and artistic self-development and expres-
sion.l These rights are the higher law to which problematic acts like 
citizen violence must be referred in order to discover their justifi-
ability. The classes of rights are interlocking in the sense that the 
infringement of one right or class of rights is apt to affect the 
practice of rights in the other classes. At this point Aiken also 
states that no single right has absolute value in the face of the 
others; no fixed order of priority can be established.2 
Violence is thus understood as an infringement of human rights. 
But violence may also be used as a means to secure these rights: 
According to liberalism proper, violence as injury is 
to be understood in the first instance as a function of 
exercises of force that involve violations of human 
rights .... On the other side ... the exercise of 
force is in general justifiable only in order to insure 
or extend human rights. When the rights of any person or 
group of persons are infringed, they are entitled to 
redress on the part of those who infringe such rights. 
And when argument fails to secure appropriate forms of 
redress they are entitled, other things equa 1, to use 
force in order to secure redress.3 
In the last partof this article Aiken goes on to discuss the 11 liberal 11 
conception of the rule of law and in this connection gives some 
11 principles of justice 11 which, to be moral, the rule of law must 
incorporate. Most of these do not bear on the question of citizen 
violence and ruler killing. Where his 11 principles of justice 11 do 
concern violence it is merely as a reiteration of the previous 
statement about force as a means to secure redress of the infringement 
of human rights. 
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Aiken does not specifically mention violence against the ruler as 
a means of securing basic rights for a disadvantaged group. Though 
the right to life is included in the second group of basic rights, 
Aiken very specifically says that no single right is to have absolute 
priority over the others. Consequently, the ruler•s right to life may 
presumably be forfeited in the face of some unspecified condition of 
ensuring or extending this right or other rights to other persons. 
But having shown that ruler killing is not explicitly prohibited in 
Aiken 1 s argiUment, we must discover if the argHment can provide us·with 
a justification of ruler killing such as we have outlined in the three 
requirements for justification. 
Aiken•s argument clearly addresses itself to the first require-
ment. His basic human rights are certainly meant to have the same 
function as a basic moral principle in a moral justification. Since 
violence is only justifiable for Aiken when it is used to preserve or 
extend these rights the connection is firmly established between 
justifiable violence and the basic moral values in Aiken•s justifi-
cation. 
The second and third requirements for moral justification, which 
entail a way of ordering competing moral claims and specifying any 
relevant objective critetia to be considered, are left unanswered 
purposely it appears from Aiken•s statements in this regard. In 
addition to the previously cited statement about the absolute priority 
among the basic rights we find: 
From the point of view of liberalism proper, no human 
right takes absolute priority over all others. The 
infringement of a material right may be more serious in 
particular circumstances than an infringement of a 
spiritual right or a right pertaining to enlightenment. 
Nor, when conflicts occur, is there any set formula for 
deciding in all cases which right should be given priority . 
. . . Accordingly. no hard rule can be provided for settling 
issues of the sort here in view.4 
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Not only does this position rule out the use of a Priority Rule (such 
as we found in Rawls) to order the competing moral claims, but it 
seems to prevent Aiken from being able to give ~qualifying criteria 
for justifiable acts of violence. 
Because we are given no guidelines as to which acts of citizen 
violence would be justified, other than to say they must involve the 
securing of human rights, it is impossible to say with certainty 
whether or not ruler killing is justifiable. We can see that it is not 
prima facie ,prohibited by Aiken•s argument but the argument can take 
us no further toward a positive justification of ruler killing. 
Indeed, an attempt to specify circumstances justifying any infringement 
of rights is impossible on the basis of Aiken•s argument because of the 
lack of a priority principle. 
Citizen Violence and Freedom 
An interesting argument with the same general structure as Aiken•s 
is one made by Jesse McDade in his article 11 The Ethicality of 
Revolution ... Borrowing the concept of 11 freedom 11 as man•s essence from 
Sartre. McDade has it serve the same function in this argument as 
11 human rights .. performed in Aiken • s argument. 
Freedom is a prerequisite for moral autonomy and exist-
ential integrity---it therefore cannot be justifiably 
abridged. The negation of freedom is justifiable only 
if it serves the interests of freedom.5 
The person who argues for the ethicality of revolu-
tion does not have to deny that if such an action is 
avoidable, that is, if freedom can be realized without 
the loss of life, this is desirable. But we would hold 
that if oppressors must die in order to eradicate oppression 
this action, thus, while laden with some negativity, is 
preferable to the continuation of oppression. The failure 
to act works to the detriment of man, while action enhances 
.the possibility of man.6 
Though the argument is hampered by a lack of specific detail about 
how this essential freedom manifests- itself in the world and thus how 
it becomes involved in political realities, McDade is somewhat more 
specific than Aiken in discussing the balancing of other moral claims 
against the claims of freedom. 
The struggle for freedom in revolution also has its 
norms. Simply to issue a declaration against injustice, 
oppression, etc., does not permit one to use any means 
necessary. If one takes his ends seriously he must assess 
his means reverently, for it is possible to negate the ends 
in the exercise of the means. By this I mean that one 
cannot be logically consistent nor ethically coherent if 
his humanistic rhetoric bears no relation to his revolution-
ary tactics of wanton destruction. There must be an appro-
priate rationale and ethical restraints to govern one•s 
mode of conduct. Such restraint is indespensible for one•s 
ends (the realization of one•s humanity) is also present in 
the means (the possiblity of conducting oneself humanely).? 
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The first requirement of justification is therefore fulfilled to about 
the same extent in McDade as in Aiken. The second, thought to be 
incapable of a general answer by Aiken, is discussed in the above 
quotation but in such vague terms, 11 appropirate rational, 11 .. ethical 
restraints, .. as to be of little help in resolving the obvious conflicts 
among competing moral rules. 
With regard to the objective criteria of the third requirement, 
McDade concentrates on the calculation of the possible success of the 
revolutionary action. 
But one cannot leave the ethicality of revolution here; 
there is more to be said. If a revolution is to be an 
ethical act it must include a calculation of its possible 
success and the realization of its objectives. In a word, 
the revolution must have a reasonable hope of success, and 
reasonableness means more than wishful thinking. One•s 
assessment must be realistic .... 
to miscalculate is disastrous for it will result in the 
slaughter of the revolutionary or a wave of increased 
repression and terror. Without survivors action is 
impossible. But equally as alarming would be the plights 
of the survivors of an abortive revolution. Not only 
would they continue to languish in a context of 'unfreedom,' 
but that freedom would be radically curtailed. A realistic 
assessment is crucial, for the justification of the 
sacrifices made can only take on legitimacy if the sacrifice 
results in a better way of life for the survivors and their 
posterity.8 -
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We will encounter this demand for a 11 reasonable hope of success .. again 
in other arguments. Its function as a criterion in justification here 
appears to be something like an admonition that serious acts of 
violence are,not be undertaken without considerable thought as to their 
consequences. In this argument, it is not at all clear what is 
involved in the 11Calculation of its possible success, .. nor is it clear 
that this criterion is really a moral consideration at all. The 
chances of one's succeeding might influence one's attempting or not 
attempting an act, but it is not clear that the chances for success are 
a part of the justification of the act. We will have occasion to 
examine this point again when it is used as a criterion in other argu-
ments. With McDade at least, the argument is not specific enough in 
any area to allow us to understand the function of an act's chances of 
success in its moral justification. Surely some almost hopeless 
attempts are morally justified and this McDade seems to want to deny. 
Though McDade does not talk about 11 ruler" killing specifically, 
he does include killing of the 11 0ppressors 11 as a possible action in 
the revolutionary activity he intends to justify; the connection 
between the two terms is obvious. 
We have seen that McDade's argument bears a close resemblance to 
that of Henry Aiken, 'freedom' merely replar;:tng . _human·rtghts'·as the 
object of the higher law. Besides borrowing the concept of 'freedom' 
from Sartre, however, McDade makes frequent use of quotes from Franz 
Fanon and Herbert Marcuse. Thus we can move quite easily from dis-
cussing 'freedom' in McDade's argument to Marcuse's own justification 
of citizen violence based on the 11 evolution 11 or 11 progress 11 of human 
freedom and happiness. 
Vfdlence and the Progress of Happiness 
Herbert Marcuse, in his essay 11 Ethics and Revolution, 11 poses the 
following question: 
Can a revolution be justified as right, as good, perhaps 
even as necessary, and justified not merely in political 
terms (as expedient for certain interests) but in ethical 
terms, that is to say, justified with respect to the human 
condition as such, to the potential of man in a given 
historical situation?9 
This question is, he says, the guiding one in his discussion of the 
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relation between ethics and revolution. Though our own interest is not 
in the justification of revolution per se, Marcuse's topic includes the 
justification of citizen violence against rulers, since revolutionary 
activity is directed against the government in power (the rulers) and 
it is violent activity that is in need of justification as, 11 Peaceful 
revolutions, if there are such things, if there can be such things, do 
not present any problems LC?f justificatioli7 ... 10 In the considerations 
which make up Marcuse's 11 historical calculus 11 we will find that the 
ruler killing is certainly not excluded as a revolutionary tactic. 
Marcuse bases his justification for revolutionary violence on the 
va 1 ues of 11 freedom 11 and 11 happi ness: .. 
Under this hypothesis, 11 good 11 and 11 right 11 would mean 
serving to establish, to promote, or to extend human 
freedom and happiness in a commonwealth, regardless of the 
form of government. This preliminary defin1tion combines 
individual and personal. private and public welfare. It 
tries to recapture a basic concept of classical political 
philosophy which has been all too often repressed, nari1ely, 
that the end of government is not only the greatest . 
possible freedom but also the greatest possible happiness 
of man, that is t~ say, a life without fear and misery, and 
a life in peace.l 
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Combining these values with the question at the beginning of the essay 
he finds that: 
We can therefore reformulate the intial question by 
asking: Is the revolutionary use of violence justifiable 
as a means for establishing or promoting human freedom 
and happiness? The question implies a very important 
assumption, namely, that there are rational criteria for 
determining the possiblities of human freedom and happi-
ness available to a society in a specific historical 
situation. If there are no such rational criteria, it 
would be impossible to evaluate a political movement in 
terms of its chances to attain a greater extent or a higher 
degree of freedom and happiness in society.l2 
The .. rational criteria 11 which would allow one to evaluate a political 
movement's chances in extending freedom and happiness in a society are 
Marcuse's primary concern in the rest of his argument. Having given 
the values (freedom and happiness) on which his justification is based, 
rational criteria of action in pursuit of these values would if 
sufficiently elaborated, perhaps be all that were necessary for a 
complete justification . 
. to claim an ethical and moral right, a revolution-
ary movement must be able to give rational grounds for its 
chances to grasp real possibilities of human freedom and 
happiness, and it must be able to demonstrate the adequacy 
of its means for obtaining this end.l3 
One of Marcuse's first specifications about criteria is that they 
be 11 historical criteria ... Of this 11 historical calculus 11 he says: 
... namely, calculation of the chances of a future 
society as against the chances of the existing society 
with respect to human progress, that is to say, technical 
and material progress used in such a way that it increases 
individual. freedom and happiness.l4 
There are several factors which the 11 historical calculus 11 must take 
into account and which constitute its 11 historical 11 nature. On the 
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side of the existing society, the status quo, must be weighted the 
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sacrifices made for it, 11 the number of victims made in defense of this 
society in war and peace, in the struggle for existence, indivudual 
and national."l5 Also on this side must be placed the capacity of the 
existing society for using the intellectual and material resources 
available to i ~ to satisfy human needs and 11 pacify the struggle for 
existence." Against these considerations on the side of the revolu-
tionary movement, must be counted the chances of improving ·the society, 
11Whether the revolutionary plan or program demonstrates the technical, 
material, and mental possiblity of reducing the sacrifices and the 
number of victims . 11 16 
Lest it be objected that his historical calculus ignores the 
claims of morality in favor of simple expedience, Marcuse argues that 
morality too is to be placed, where it always in fact belonged, in the 
historical situation. 
The ethics of revolution, if there is such a thing, 
will therefore be in accordance not w,ith absolute, but 
with historical standards. They do not cancel the vali-
dity of those general norms which formulate requirements 
for the progress of mankind toward humanity .... How-
ever, within the historical continuum, revolutions establish 
a moral and ethical code of their own and in this way become 
the origin, fhe fountainhead and source of new general norms 
and values.l 
In his insistence on the historical situation as the determining factor 
tn oonventiona 1 morality, Marc use shows the i nfl oence of Mar.x,f.sm.l8 
Despite the fact that Sydney Hook labels Marcuse a 11 Leninist 11 and not 
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a Marxist because of Marcuse's "elitism and unabashed justification of 
forcible repression of ideas, persons, or institutions," in this 
matter of the historical evolution of morality, at least, he is in-
debted to Marx )9 
Marcuse makes some comments on applying the historical calculus to 
the revolutionary situation or the situation with revolutionary 
potential. 
Can the intended new society, the society intended by the 
revolution, offer better chances for progress in freedom 
than the existing society? In the historical continuum, 
these chances can only be measured by going beyond the 
given state of affairs, going beyond it not simply into an 
abstract vacuum of speculation, but goi'ng beyond it by 
calculating the resources, intellectual as well as ma-
terial, scientific as well as technical, available to a 
given society, and projecting the most rational ways of 
utilizing these resources.20 
Nor I submit that, while the historical function of a 
revolution bec;omes identifiable only after the fact, its 
prospective direction, progressive or regressive is, with 
the certainty of a reasonable chance, demonstrable before 
the fact---to the same degree to which the historical 
conditions of progress are demonstrable.21 
But these do not provide much help in explaining or elaborating his 
basic argument. They seem instead to be merely restating what he has 
already said . 
. . . on the basis of this quantifiable material the 
question can be asked whether the available resources and 
capabilities are utilized most rationally, that is to say, 
with a view to the best possible satisfaction of needs 
under the priority of vital needs and with a minimum of 
toil, misery and injustice. If the analysis of a specific 
historical situation suggests a negative answer, if con-
ditions exist in which technological rationality is 
impeded or even superseded by repressive political and 
social interests which define the gen~ral welfare, then 
the reversal of such conditions in favor of a more rational 
and human use of the available resources would also be a 
maximalization of the chance of progr~ss in freedom.22 
There is nothing, in this article at least, to suggest what Marcuse 
means by 11 the priority of vital needs 11 or to suggest what would con-
stitute a 11more rational and human use of the available resources.•• 
He does, however, mention some of the factors which would figure in 
the historical calculus. 
Calculable are the material and intellectual resources 
available, calculable are productive and distributive 
facilities in a society, and the extent of unsatisfied 
vital needs and of satisfied nonvital needs. Quanti-
fiable and calculable are the quantity and size of the 
labor force and of the population as a whole. That is 
the empirical material at the disposal of the historical 
calculus.23 
Because these are the only 11 hard 11 realities which we have at our dis-
posal, these, rather than outmoded ethical rules or concepts, must be 
the foundation of our reasoning through the historical calculus. 
11 History, 11 says Marcuse, 11 is ~ se amoral and immoral.u24 
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It is clear that the foundation for the entire argument is what we 
might ca 11 the 11 hi gher 1 aw 11 of progress toward human happiness and 
freedom. In its role as primary moral consideration this higher law 
functions to fulfill the first requirement of justification. Marcuse•s 
explanation in this article of what he means by ••progress•• or 11 happi-
ness and freedom 11 is certainly not sufficient for us to be able to 
judge the adequacy of this 11 higher law 11 as the foundation of an 
ethical system. Because of the limited nature of any argument of 
article length, a comparison between Marcuse•s defense (or lack of 
defense) of his higher law and, for example Rawls• detailed arguments 
for his two principles of justice in his book fl Theory of Justice, 
would be somewhat unfair. 
It is possible as we said above that the progress toward freedom 
and happiness is not just a 11 higher law 11 than the ordinary 
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considerations of· political stability, but that it is the. 11 highest 
law ... the only moral consideration which stands outside of the his tor-
ical situation. Though the form the j:Jrogre'SSJ takes would oerta:i·nl:y 
change with the evolution of humanity, the law of progress itself 
could not change. This is one way in which Marcuse's argument handles 
the second requirement for justification, i.e. the balancing of other 
moral claims. Since one is, in promoting the progress of freedom, 
obeying the highest moral law, all other historically determined moral 
rules take a secondary place. 
Of course this emphasis on progress is to be balanced by the 
considerations of rationality introduced in the 11 historical calculus ... 
To this Marcuse also adds a prohibition against some kinds of action 
which cannot be justified: 
No matter how rationally one may justify revolutionary means 
in terms of the demonstrable chance of obtaining freedom 
and happiness for future generations, and thereby justify 
violating existing rights and liberties and life itself, 
there are forms of violence and suppression which no revo-
lutionary situation can justify because they negate the 
very end for which the revolution is a means. Such are 
arbitrary violence, cruelty, and indiscriminate terror.25 
This prohibition. easy though it is to agree with, seems an integral 
part of neither the 11 highest law .. of progress nor of the historical 
calculus. The claim that these acts negate the end being sought 
does not prevent the feeling that the prohibition itself is somewhat 
11 tacked on 11 to the argument. 
Thus. while competing moral claims would be subordinate for the 
most part to demands of progress as an immutable 11 law, .. the objective 
criteria for action demanded by the third requirement for justification 
are contained in the historical calculus. In this article at least, 
the historical calculus is not given enough detail to allow any kind 
of decision about the 11 rational ity 11 of violence in a particular set-
ting. It is not as· if Marcuse were just asking us to reason about 
the effects of violence on the future, certain writers would claim 
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that using this as a criterion for justification becomes an impossible 
guessing game in itself; but we are simply not given enough information 
about what to consider and how to weigh the different factors in the 
historical calculus to show us how such an important reasoning process 
is to proceed.26 
Even with these faults, however, of the three 11 higher law 11 argu-
ments discussed in this chapter Marcuse•s is certainly the most 
complete~ He does, in his own way, recognize the three requirements 
for a moral justification and speak in a part of his argument to each 
of them. One gathers from his article that he feels he has given a 
rational justification for revolutionary violence; our examination 
of his argument shows his justificat~on to be still incomplete. When 
we have finished our exposition with an examination of the utilitarian 
arguments on citizen violence we will be in a position to compare 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE "UTILITARIAN" ARGUMENTS 
The first of the three arguments in this chapter refers to the 
morality which forms its foundation as "teleological (which does not 
necessarily imply utilitarian)." We will find, however, in our dis-
cussion of this argument that its somewhat confusing attempt at justi-
fication and the only partial success it therefore achieves in 
satisfying our requirements for a complete justification serve as a 
good introduction to the more fully developed arguments which follow 
it. Clyde Frazier does in fact present the first justification as a 
sort of example of the ordinary moral reasoning which the citizen, 
possessed of the aforementioned teleological morality, must carry out 
in assessing the justifiability of an act of citizen violence. In 
discussing the arguments of Howard Zinn and Richard Brandt we will 
find that their somewhat more cearly defined moral foundations (more 
obviously utilitarian than in Frazier•s argument) seem to allow a 
more highly developed justification both in relation to the balancing 
of conflicting moral claims and the specification of criteria which 
a justifiable act must satisfy. 
Justific~tion on the Basis of a 
Teleological Morality 
Clyde Frazier•s main interest in his article "Between Obedience 
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Revolution 11 is in defining and justifying the range of acts between 
(what he feels to be) overly restricted non-violent civil disobedience 
and overtly revolutionary activity. This continuum would include acts 
of civil disobedience of lesser to greater violence up to the stated 
limit of those acts aimed at overthrowing the government.l At that 
point, presumably, Frazier sees other factors entering into consider-
ation which would place revolutionary violence outside the bounds of 
the justification he offers. 
In his argument for justification Frazier first clears away what 
he considers to be misconceptions about arriving at general standards 
for justified and unjustified protest. 
In one sense, at least, the notion of justifying acts 
of resistance to the state presents grave problems. It 
is clear that one cannot hope to justify such resistance 
in a sense of reaching commonly agreed upon criteria to 
distinguish justified from unjustified instances. The 
very recourse to disobedience in the first place seems to 
indicate that such common standards have broken down. 
There is no rule or principle one can look to as a 
justification for disobedience that might not itself 
be subject to controversy .... This does not mean, 
of course, that acts of resistance are never justified. 
Many are (although many are not), and as actors in the 
political system we are constantly called on to make deci-
sions about the justification of such acts and to behave 
accordingly. It does mean, however, that we cannot hope 
to find publicly agreed upon standards on which to base 
our judgments.2 
His position seems to rule out the kinds of agreement that Rawls and 
Honderich, for example, hoped to achieve in their justifications based 
on the general Principles of Justice in the former case and the Rules 
for Democracy in the latter. 
As a way around the controversy over basic principles in the 
11Consent 11 arguments and of avoiding at the same time any explicit 
statement of a controversial 11 higher law 11 on which to base the 
justification, Frazier offers instead an argument from an unspecified 
11 teleological morality ... 
If the citizen•s moral system is teleological (which 
does not necessarily imply utilitarian), he will attempt 
to determine his moral duty by weighing the consequences 
of the various courses of action open to him. Since I 
feel that such teleological morality is predominant in 
our society, I would like to turn finally to an examina-
tion of some of the problems involved in an attempt to 
balance these conflicting moral claims from the stand-
point of a teleological moral system.3 
Although Frazier says the system within which he is working is not 
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necessarily utilitarian his reasoning fits within the general framework 
of this type of moral system. 
The ar.gument itself is quite simple. Based as it is on a 
teleological morality, the rightness or wrongness of an act is 
dependant on the desirability or undesirability of the effects of the 
act. 
... the disobedient will have to balance this danger 
!lO the stater against the good he proposes to achieve 
oy his act. ~e will have to estimate the relative weights 
of these factors in terms of his own system of values, 
but whatever system he uses it seems safe to say that 
the greater the good he aims at, or the greater the evil 
he seeks to eliminate, the easier it will be to justify 
an act of resistance. A disobedient must weigh not only 
the magnitude of the good he desires but also the chance 
he has of achieving it. Numerous practical considerations 
affecting the probability of success or4failure will thus 
be relevant to the decision to disobey. 
The above quotation introduces two other factors which must be taken 
into account. The citizen must weigh the possiblity of destroying 
the existing political system against the benefits to be won by his 
act. 
To the extent that he is an enthusiastic supporter of 
the existing regime, his estimation of the damage his 
act will do will tend to dissuade him from disobedience. 
To the extent that he places a very low value on the 
existing system generally, he will be:less concerned 
about the adverse consequences of his act for the sta-
bility of the state. He may feel that he has not much 
to lose by an act of disobedience even if it backfires, 
and thus he will not be so easily dissuaded by the fact 
that he may endanger social stability.5 
Not only the value he places on the existing system but also the 
threat which the particular kind of act h~ is considering poses to 
the system must be estimated, since some acts of citizen violence 
. ' 
or resistance, e.g. bombing unoccupied buildings, are less dangerous 
to the state than others, like kidnapping or murdering political 
1 eaders. 
Another factor which Frazier says must enter into the justifi-
cation of such acts is the chance of success of the act. The 
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11 probability of success of failure 11 in achieving the desired end is, 
just as in Marcuse•s argument, a matter of the calculation of numerous 
practical considerations and is, Frazier thinks, an important element 
of the justification of the act. But it is no more clear here than 
it was in Marcuse11sargument how this element of the probability of 
success of the action is to be integrated into the justification. Not 
until we discuss Richard Brandt•s utilitarian method of justification 
will we encounter an argument which allows for the systematic inclusion 
of this element of probability into the justification itself. Here 
Frazier merely states it as a consideration without giving us any idea 
as to how it is to be weighted against other claims. For example, the 
quantity of the harm being suffered must somehow b~ balanced against 
the probable success of the violent act in relieving the suffering. 
But whether a great amount of suffering would justify attempting 
a remedy with only a small chance of success (as would seem reasonable 
in the absence of alternatives), Frazier does not say. 
Examining this argument for insights into our specific question 
concerning the justification of ruler killing we find two things. 
First, it must be recalled that Frazier's argument is not intended 
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to justify revolutionary acts. Ruler killing would in most cases do 
serious damage to the stability of the state. "Acts of violence 
directed against persons, such as murder and kidnapping, are intrin-
sically repulsive as well as posing a very radical threat to the 
state's authority."6 Because of the danger it poses to the state, 
ruler killing as a revolutionary act would probably be excluded from 
justification by this argument. The second point from the same quota-
tion is that ruler killing is also excluded from justification because 
it would be "intrinsically repulsive." "Certain acts, notably acts of 
violence against persons, have immediate consequences which are so 
repulsive that most disobedients will rule them out regardless of their 
effectiveness."? Frazier does not explain the "immediate consequences" 
which make violence against persons repulsive. It is clear, however, 
that from this second qualification alone ruler killing would be 
unjustifiable by this argument. But because of the arbitrary and 
unsupported form of Frazier's statement against violence toward persons 
combined with the possibility of some acts of ruler killing being 
non-revolutionary, and thus within the scope of his justification, one 
feels that though Frazier would deny the justifiability of ruler 
killing he has not here presented a sufficient reason for this denial. 
On none of the three requirements for a complete justification is 
Frazier's argument specific enough or detailed enough to be completely 
satisfactory. As a moral rule on which to ground acts of citizen 
violence he gives only an unspecified "teleological morality" wherein 
"the consequences of the various courses of action" are weighed to 
determine one•s moral duty. Having no specific rule on which to base 
the problematic acts of citizen violence we are at a loss as to how 
I 
to regard the contrary claims of other moral rules. This second 
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requirement of a justification, that it answer the claims made against 
it by other moral rules, provides the impulse for Frazier•s discussion 
of the value of the existing state and his prohibition of violence 
against persons as "intrinsically repulsive." But the realization that 
other moral considerations must be weighed against acts of resistance 
or violence should have been carried through into some kind of syste-
matic thought on the relative values of the claims. In addition to 
the unspecified "practical considerations affecting the probability 
of success or failure" of the act, Frazier mentions one other objective 
criterion which would relate to the third requirement for justifica-
tion. 
Not only must he weigh against the good he desires to 
accomplish the evil his act may bring about, but he must 
also weigh against it the likelihood that he cag achieve 
the same end through normal political channels. 
This criterion would assure us that any serious or destructive action 
to be undertaken would be uniquely suited to bring about the desired 
end. 
It may be rather misleading to expect Frazier•s argument to 
provide a justification for acts of violence such as political 
assassinations. His stated aim is to discuss the range of possible 
justifiable action between passive non-violent civil disobedience and 
revolutionary violence. Political assassination may be too closely 
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tied to revolutionary violence to fall within the stated limits of the 
argument. What we have seen by examining this argument is that a tele-
ological morality might provide a satisfactory justification for active 
resistance and even for citizen violence if the system were suf-
ficiently worked out. Frazier's argument is for this purpose much too 
general, but it points the way to the more specifically utilitarian 
justifications that follow. 
Ruler Killing and 11Act Utilitarianism .. 
One of the problems we found with Frazier's argument was that he 
did not say enough about his basic assumptions, the teleological 
morality on which he gounded his justification of resistance. Howard 
Zinn, in the two articles from which we are drawing his argument, has 
somewhat the same intention as did Frazier in his article. He is 
defending citizen violence against the charge that because it is 
intentionally destructive it is in no way related to 11 Civil disobe-
dience, .. which the critics of citizen violence have defined as strictly 
non-violent. But Zinn discusses in more detail than Frazier the basic 
premises of his morality and spends some time on the general process 
by which one makes moral decisions in this system. Unfortunately, 
linn's argument is also incomplete as a justification for citizen 
violence, as we will see. 
There are in the two articles several statements which point to 
the teleological nature of the author's system of morality. 
Last month, in Atlanta, an eighteen-year-old boy was shot 
and killed while running away from the scene of a vending-
machine robbery that had netted him $3.84. The policeman 
who Shot him was not firing at a human being, but at a 
symbol: a thief, an enemy of society. The policeman 
was defending another symbol: private property. As symbols, 
abstracted from flesh and blood, the solution is simple: 
private property must be protected. As reality, it looks 
different: the life of an eighteen-year-old boy against 
the loss of $3.84.9 
linn is objecting here to the abstracting from reality and the rule 
making and rule enforcing which causes moral decisions to be made 
without any consideration of the effects in terms of happiness and 
unhappiness. He goes on: 
In capital punishment, too, we are not weighing how 
much justice will be accomplished by the act of judicial 
murder. If we did, the answer would be obvious: execu-
tion of a human being--no matter how foul his deed--
cannot bring more happiness, more justice, into the world.10 
It is clear that linn feels moral decisions are most reasonably made 
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on the basis of their effects and that the deciding factor is' happiness 
or unhappiness to be realized. Though he does not label it as such, 
linn's moral system is a form of utilitarianism, and on the basis of 
the examples he gives he seems to mistrust rules and favor instead 
judging each act separately. Thus, if a label is needed, we seem 
to be dealing with a variety of 11 act utilitarianism ... And on the basis 
of these statements, in addition to the way he develops his argument 
further on, it is clear that when linn defends acts of violence his 
defense is based on the idea of producing the greatest amount of 
happiness from the situation. In this way he fulfills, much more fully 
than Frazier, the first requirement we have set for a complete justifi-
cation. 
If we are, in linn's argument, working in a primarily act utili-
tarian system then our second requirement, that a justification should 
take account of the moral claims to be made against citizen violence, 
can be treated somewhat differently than in the previous arguments. 
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These contrary claims, usually couched in the language of rules, would 
have weight here only in proportion to the net gain in happiness 
resulting from whatever contrary course of action they might urge. 
It is not true, as some say, that bad means always 
corrupt the ends. If the amount of evil embodied in the 
means is tiny and amount of good created by the end is 
huge, then the end is not corrupted--either objectively 
in the result or subjectively in the conscience of the 
doer .11 
A moral rule such as "bad means always corrupt the ends" must be trans-
lated into the quantities of good and evil or happiness and unhappiness 
that it represents in terms of the particular act in question. The 
rule that violence is always to be avoided is treated in the same way. 
The Freedom Riders behaved nonviolently. But their action 
did bring violence against themselves, and against others. 
Nonviolence theorists will insist that the responsibility 
for the violence rests with those who committed it. But 
this dodges the question; the fact is that there was more 
violence in the world after the Freedom Riders began their 
rides than before. And for this there is only one justi-
fication: that the amount of violence was insignificant 
compared to the amount of justice won.l2 
The amount of violence resulting from the action does count against it, 
but the final verdict in this balancing of claims is based on the 
amount of happiness to be gained overall .13 He continues: 
In a world of great injustice, we need social change. 
Social change requires action. Action may result, either 
by design or by accident, in violence. The fact must be 
faced. And violence is an evil, along with injustice. 
The only way, then, to decide upon a course of action is 
to weigh the damage of violence against the damage of 
social injustice ... Our values are multiple; they 
sometimes clash; and we need to weigh, weigh, weigh.l4 
The consideration of contrary moral claims is thus integrated into the 
general process of making a moral decision or in this case justifying 
a particular problematic act. The ultimate justification in this 
system is always that the action results in more happiness than would 
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be realized without it. 
Zinn does not introduce any special qualifying criteria that acts 
of violence must satisfy in order to be justified. Since any such 
considerations would be important only in the way they affected the 
net product of happiness versus unhappiness they pose no special 
problems for the process of justification. The only extra demand that 
Zinn makes which could be thought of as relating especially to the 
third requirement for justification concerns the relationship between 
nonviolence and violence. 
Still it is terribly important to understand that our 
starting point should be pacifism, that the burden of 
proof should be placed on the arguer for violence. 
Just as a man should be considered innocent until proved 
guilty, a policy should be automatiCally nonviolent 
until the weight of reason, undistorted by symbolism, 
argues otherwise.15 
Nonviolence is the standard from which we depart only for the sake of a 
reasonably certain increase in happiness or social good. 
As to how far we may depart from this standard, Zinn places no set 
limits. One of the reasons for examining his argument in particular is 
that Zinn recognizes the justifiability of political assassinations 
in some certain circumstances. 
Violence might be justifiable as it approaches the 
focusing and control of surgery. Self-defense is by its 
nature focused, because it is counterviolence directed 
only at a perpetrator of violence .... Planned acts of 
violence in an enormously important cause (the Resistance 
against Hitler may be an example) could be justifiable. 
Revolutionary warfare, the more it is aimed carefully at 
either foreign controlling power, or a local tyrannical 
elite, may be morally defensible.l6 
The "moral defense" in this case would be ,based on the greater social 
good to be obtained by the admitted evil of violence. 
For violence seen as absolute pacifism is only one of a 
pair of linked values which humanitarian people share--
peace and social justice. The desirability of the one 
must constantly be weighed against the need for the other. 
Also, the problem is subject to internal contradiction: 
sometimes the failure to use a measure of violence may 
make inevitable a far greater violence. Would it have 
been wrong to assassinate Hitler at that moment in the 
war when this might have brought a halt to general hos-
tilities and the extermination of the Jews?l7 
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We suspect that because a great deal of pain or unhappiness is inherent 
in the act of killing anyone (both for victim and killers) the circum-
stances which could justify such an act would necessarily be very 
serious indeed. 
Thus in Zinn's argument we get a somewhat clearer idea of the 
possibilities for the justification of ruler killing in a utilitarian 
moral system than what we were able to discover in Frazier's argument. 
Rather than limiting his proposed justification to a small group of 
problematic actions, as Frazier does, Zinn offers a more general method 
for justifying a wider range of actions. This more general method not 
only admits the possible justifiability of ruler killing in certain 
instances but also goes further than Frazier's argument toward satis-
fying the three requirements for a justification. We will find in the 
final argument by Richard Brandt a further develpment both in general 
applicability and in specific detail of this utilitarian justification. 
Ruler Killing and "Rule Utilitarianism" 
In a piece called "Comment on MacCallum" which, judging from the 
title, we would expect to be merely some critical remarks on the 
previous article in the journal, Richard B. Brandt advances what is 
surely one of the shortest and at the same time most complete arguments 
in the literature ·for the justification of citizen violence and ruler 
killing. Brandt states his intention quite clearly thus: 
In what circumstances is it morally permissable to use 
violence, that is, cause or seriously:risk damage, 
personal or otherwise, in order to bring about a better 
or more just state of society? Or, more briefly, when 
is violence justified by the objective of a better 
society? This is what I want to discuss.l8 
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Brandt•s 11 discussion 11 of the problem takes the principle of utility as 
its first principle. 
Brandt approaches the problem of justification from the standpoint 
of the agent faced with the 11 real 11 alternative of violence in 
particular 11 real 11 circumstances. 
I think it is useful to apply an outcome analysis to this 
problem. That is, let us consider the damage (or disutility) 
that may be done as a result of the use of the means, and 
multiply the several possible pieces of damage (or disu-
tility) by a fraction representing the probability that the 
loss will occur if the act is performed. Let us call the 
sum of these products the expectable disutility of the act. 
Then let us consider all the good that might occur, and 
multiply the values of the several parts of this by the 
probability that each of. them will occur if the act is 
performed; this sum of products is the expectable utility 
of the action.l9 
This 110utcome analysis .. gives the agent some idea of the effects, both 
good and bad, of the contemplated action. Brandt•s method has the 
added advantage of i ncl udi ng the probabi 1 ity·_of :.occurreoee-o·r·~the 
expected effects in this one operation. A quasi-mathematical method 
such as this for determining the utility oLan aCti.on would be 'f"e-
assuring in this area of uncertain cause and effect. 
In conriection with this first operation of determining the 
expected utility of the action, Brandt cautions against allowing the 
11Sincere belief .. in the good effects of an action to constitute a moral 
justification for doing it. 
In the first place, let me observe that there is 
agreement, I think, that sincere belief is no defense 
against criticism, if one could have got better information. 
If one is going to injure other people, one at least has 
an obligation to get one's facts straight; if one does 
not bother to do this, one cannot claim the sanctity 
of any excuse other than that of sheer stupidity .... 
Is there a moral obligation to do what will surely injure 
others,if one sincerely believes that so doing will 
produce much good, before one has made any serious inquiry 
whether it will do good? I should think not; in the 
circumstances the first obligation is to get the facts 
straight.20 · 
Sincere belief, or one might say 11 good intentions, 11 are to be in a 
sense replaced or at least de-emphasized as elements in justification 
by the more objective process of the outcome analysis. 
Given the results of the outcome analysis in terms of expected 
utility and disutility the question then arises as to what difference 
between these two values would justify our carrying out an act of 
violence like assassination. Brandt puts the question this way: 
But exactly when are we justified in causing or risking 
damage to others for the sake of social advance? Let us 
assume we have been careful with our outcome analysis, 
and we are sure that there is a net expectable gain from 
the use of violence. Now, whatever the act utilitarian may 
say, it seems to me clear that one has no right to cause 
or risk serious expectable injury to others when the net 
expectable gain (over the loss) is very small .21 
As political assassination certainly causes serious injury to persons 
it is clear that a small expectable difference in utility over dis-
utility is not sufficient to justify this act. But Brandt goes on to 
consider other circumstances: 
I venture the following as a principle I think we might 
stand on. First. if the positive outcome is highly 
probable or certain, and the net gain, if it is achieved, 
is very large, then one is justified in risking or even 
causing serious damage, and probably morally obligated 
to doso .. On the other hand, if the net gain, if it is 
achieved, is fairly small, or the probability of it is 




Having discussed the two extreme cases in which the difference between 
expectable utility and disutility is either very large or very small, 
the probability of success increasing the difference in the former 
case and diminshing it in the latter, he must now deal with the cases 
which fall between these two extremes. 
I think that if one is contemplating violence in one of the 
middle cases, one has to face the fact that the morality 
of the action is not obviously in the clear. One has to 
ask one's self whether in the long run it would be bene-
ficial for society if everyone felt obligated, or were 
taught to feel obligated, to risk the welfare of other 
persons, when the chances that their welfare will be harmed 
are what they are in the present case; and when the extent 
of the probable harm is what it is in the present case, for 
the sake of a better society, when the chances of its really 
being made better, and the extent to which it will be made 
better, are what they are in the present case.23 · 
The answer, then, in considering one of these middle cases is to be 
found by elevating one's action to the status of a rule. If society 
would be improved by everyone's acting in this way when faced with the 
given difference between utility and disutility, then one is 11morally 
in the clear, 11 as Brandt says. About ruler killing one must ask 
himself if society would be improved if everyone considered ruler 
killing obligatory given the same circumstances of risk and probability 
of gain that we face. By thinking in terms of the utility of rules, 
rather than of isolated acts, it seems that Brandt intends to avoid 
justifying political assassinations which have only what we might call 
11marginal utility. 11 If the risk is too great or the degree of happi-
ness to be realized is too small, then, Brandt thinks, the danger to 
society wiil be evident when the proposed actions are generalized into 
rules. 
Brandt's process of justifying indivudual acts is itself justified 
by the same principle of utility. 
You might ask, How do I justify these principles? 
The answer is: In the long run society will be better 
off if. people are taught these moral principles, than 
if they are taught some other substantially different 
moral principles.24 
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In other words, if people are taught to act only in ways which would 
be justified by the process he has outlined (outcome analysis, high or 
low difference in utility versus disutility, etc.) then society would 
be benefitted to the greatest extent possible. The principle of 
utility thus permeates and in a sense anchors the argument from top 
to bottom. 
Because this argument is basically very simple in design and yet 
at the same time quite cohesive in thought, it is rather difficult 
to draw out into separate strands the ways in which it meets the 
requirements for justification. The first requirement is quite clearly 
satisfied by grounding each stage of the argument on the principle of 
utility. This principle is both the ultimate justification for the 
act of violence and the guiding principle in the more immediate process 
of separating justified from unjustified acts. The outcome analysis, 
which is the first step in this process, is the point at which any 
moral claims against the act are taken into account by translating them 
into a quantity of disutility which is then integrated into the 
weighting process. The answering of contrary moral claims, which con-
stitutes the second requirement for justification, is thus accomplished 
in a manner seemingly quite unique to such utilitarian arguments. The 
only incidental consideration, or what we have called elsewhere 
110bjective criterion, .. that Brandt mentions is the obligation to 11 get 
the facts straight... Special emphasis is put here because if the facts 
pertaining to the expectable utilities and disutilities are incomplete 
or incorrect then the outcome analysis is worthless, and the whole 
justification process collapses. One might well call the entire 
analysis outcome process an objective criterion, thus using it to 
satisfy the third requirement for justificat-Ion; but we have seen 
that this same process serves to satisfy the second requirement 
as well . 
Thus in our examination of this final argument we find the same 
integration of requirements and functional features that we found in 
cruder form in the first two arguments in this chapter. Brandt soli-
difies the somewhat diffuse reasoning of the first two utilitarian 
arguments in a quite concise and one might almost say 11 elegant 11 
argument for the justification of citizen violence. 
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CHAPTER V 
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSION 
Having completed a detailed examination of the arguments and 
having given some thought to the ways that each of them functions or 
fails to function as a justification for ruler killing we are now in 
a position to compare the major features of the arguments. Through 
this comparison we will find that none of the arguments discussed is 
more fully worked out than Richard Brandt's utilitarian justification. 
In spite of at least one important problem with this justification it 
would seem that of the arguments discussed here it is the most 
generally satisfactory account of a possible moral justification for 
ruler killing. Comparison of the arguments will also show that the 
ways in which they fail as complete justifications are not uoique to 
each argument but are common to other arguments as well. In this 
chapter, then, we will attempt to group the arguments in terms of 
their most characteristic problem or most serious fault and thus to 
summarize the characteristic difficulties of moral justification of 
this particular problem. 
First of all, our detailed examination of the arguments revealed 
that two of the arguments would exclude ruler killing from their 
justifications. We might call this a problem of scope, however, in 
that these arguments tended to prohibit ruler killing within the range 
of the argument but left the question open as a more general 
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possibility. The most obvious of these is in Frazier•s justification 
of citizen violence based on a .. teleological morality ... Although he 
leaves open the possibility of ruler killing in a revolutionary 
situation, simply because it is outside the range of his argument, 
Frazier insists that his argument does not intend to justify murder 
and that such acts of violence against persons are 11 intrinsically 
repulsive .. and 11most disobedients will rule them out regardless of 
their effectiveness ... 
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Though Ted Honderich•s argument also denies the justifiability of 
ruler killing within the chosen scope of the argument (in this case 
within a democracy), the prohibition here is derived more directly 
from the argument than it was in Frazier•s case. Like Frazier•s 
argument, however, Honderich•s does not rule out the possible justifi-
catibn of ruler killing in a non-democratic system. But Honderich 
does not discuss such a possibility in any detail and his particular 
argument for .. democratic violence .. does not apply in the circumstances 
of a non-democratic system. Both of these arguments then, Frazier•s 
and Honderich•s, are unsuitable as justifications for ruler killing 
because of their limited scopes. Honderich•s argument is, especially 
interesting nonetheless because of its careful construction and the 
unusual point it makes about violence in a democracy. 
Two other arguments must be eliminated from serious consideration 
as justifications because they do not mention ruler killing or poli-
tical assassination at all. We thus have no way of knowing whether 
or in what circumstances ruler killing is justifiable. Both of these 
arguments are conspicuously deficient in the area of the second 
requirement for justification, the ordering of contrary moral claims. 
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We might say, then, that these arguments are characterized by 
11priority problems. 11 Of these two, the argument by Henry David Aiken 
has the added disadvantage of being relatively vague on a number of 
other important points. We found in our analysis that it does not go 
very far in satisfying either the second or the third requirements for 
justification and without these we have no way of even speculating 
on its position toward ruler killing. 
The other argument which must be eliminated at this point, 
however, does satisfy fairly well the other requirements for justifi-
cation. The argument is Rawls• admirable edifice built on the foun-
dation of the Two Principles of Justice. The argument is quite 
satisfactory in its justification of the class of actions that it was 
designed to accomodate, i.e. nonviolent civil disobedience. But when 
we attempted to insert ruler killing into the same framework we 
encountered problems such as the one with the Priority Rule. Since 
Rawls does not talk about a· 11right to life .. in relation to the first 
principle liberties it is impossible to know whether a violation of 
these liberties could justify killing the ruler. As we pointed out 
earlier this is basically a problem of the ordering of moral claims 
against the problematic act of ruler killing. Rawls confines his own 
discussion primarily to disobedience in a nearly just society where 
this difficulty with the second requirement for justification does 
not arise as a major problem. When we press Rawls• argument for a 
justification of ruler killing the small omission from the original 
argument becomes important enough~ to prevent the argument from 
providing a clear justification. 
The next three arguments that must be eliminated as 
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unsatisfactory did, however, explicitly mention ruler killing in the 
group of actions they intended to justify. The common fault of the 
arguments of Newton, McDade, and Zinn is that they are simply too 
vague or lacking in detail to be convincing justifications. A 
characteristic problem with these arguments was their inability to 
provide concrete objective specifications for a justifiable act of 
ruler killing. Viewed from the perspective of the three requirements 
for justification, these arguments failed primarily at the level of 
the third. Newton•s argument is typical in this way. Grounded on the 
three principles which she claimed both established the right of 
revolution and characterized any good government, the argument did a 
fair job of satisfying the first requirement; and, with her references 
to John Locke, we were able to fill out the argument so that it also 
satisfied to a fair degree the second requirement for justification. 
But on the third requirement, where much of the detailed working out 
of a justification must take place, we have almost nothing. Estab-
lishing a prima facie ·right to revolution, one of Newton•s intentions, 
does not justify any particular instance of revolution, as she herself 
recognizes. One is not given any idea from this argument, how to 
proceed in attempting a justification of a particular act on its 
basis. The argument is, in a sense, truncated. 
In the argument by Jesse McDade we found some elements that 
would apply to each of the three requirements but none of them in 
enough detail to be entirely satisfactory. Furthermore, the argument 
was conspicuously lacking in objective criteria by which to determine 
the justifiability of an act of ruler killing. In examining his 
argument we found that he makes two specifications: one, that the 
violence be unavoidable to secure the freedom, and two, that the 
action have a .. reasonable hope of success ... But from our discussion 
of this second specification we saw that it is too vague, as it 
stands, to provide much help as an objective criterion. Without 
a more detailed treatment of specific criteria for recognizing 
justifiable instances of citizen violence any attempt to work out a 
justification for ruler killing based on the argument is impossible. 
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The argument advanced by Howard Zinn has much in common with the 
one by Richard Brandt. Both are utilitarian justifications, though 
Zinn's seems to be of the 11 act 11 variety while Brandt's relies more 
on 11 rules .. as the basic unit of moral decision making. Despite the 
resemblance, however, Zinn's argument is much more loosely constructed 
than Brandt's and is similar to the two previously discussed arguments 
in its lack of necessary detail. Zinn specifically says that there 
are surely some circumstances in which ruler killing is justified. 
He cites the obvious example of Adolf Hitler. But, given the risks 
involved in an assassination and the possibly bad effects that may 
accompany the good ones, Zinn offers no criteria, such as Brandt 
suggests, by which to separate those acts which are justifiable from 
those which are not before the acts are carried out. On this same 
point Zinn gives no mechanism in his formal justification by which to 
prohibit serious acts of violence which have only marginal utility, 
though by the tone of his discussion and the examples he cites (e.g. 
protecting property by killing looters), we surmise that he opposes 
such actions. While he does present a somewhat more carefully con-
structed and complete justification than either Newton or McDade, 
Zinn's argument is deficient at several important points. 
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We have saved Herbert Marcuse's justification of revolutionary 
violence until this point because of the many features it shares with 
Brandt's justification. Of course instead of the principle of 
utility, Marcuse has as his first principlP. the law of human progress 
toward freedom and happiness. But his treatment of this principle 
points up the most characteristic problem in Marcuse's argument, · 
i.e. his use of unusual concepts. The principle itself is not ex~ 
plained by Marcuse nor is it defended in any way that clarified its 
meaning. Though Brandt also declines to defend his first principle, 
the principle of utility does not contain such conf;using,concepts 
as "progress." 
Another area of some confusion in Marcuse's argument is his 
insistance that the proposed action must be placed in its "historical 
context." As we discovered in our analysis, this is apparently a way 
of dealing with the possible moral claims brought against the violent 
act. Such claims might be ignored if they prove to be the product of 
a mutable "historical morality," and are overridden by the superior 
claim of the "law of progress." But once again we are given no idea 
as to what kind of morality is "historically" determined, and what 
falls instead under the "law of progress." Marcuse' prohibition of 
arbitrary violence and indiscriminate terror may be an attempt to 
clarify the distinction, but it is certainly not sufficient. 
Related to this difficulty with the "historical moral context" 
is Marcuse's concept of the "historical calculus." Though it seems 
to be intended to serve somewhat the same function as Brandt's "out-
come analysis," Marcuse's concept is not nearly as well defined. The 
historical calculus is to tell us the chances for "progress" under the 
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system which would arise after the revolution. But we are told almost 
nothing about the factors in the society which are to make up the 
calculus or what the "calculation" itself involves. Marcuse's entire 
argument, then, suffers because of its vague language and lack of 
detail. It is this vagueness that makes it unaccpetable as a justifi-
cation for ruler killing. 
Richard Brandt does not mention ruler killing specifically in his 
justification. It is evident, however, that this general scheme for 
the justification of citizen violence could include ruler killing as 
a morally justifiable act in certain circumstances. Brandt's argument 
is thus much more valuable for our purposes than those, like 
Honderich's, in which ruler killing is left outside the scope of the 
argument and where we can only guess at its justifiability. 
Because of the nature of Brandt's arg~ment it does not fall 
easily into three parts, each one corresponding to one of the three 
requirements for justification. John Rawls' argument, for example, 
is much more clearly segmented in this way, but Rawls' argument has 
other problems, as we have seen. Brandt's process of justification 
is so constructed as to be able to fulfill these requirements without 
violating the basic unity and simplicity of the argument. The most 
obvious example of this is the way in which conflicting moral claims 
are integrated into the outcome analysis of the proposed act by 
quantifying the unhappiness they involve. The argument thus does not 
address itself specifically to this second requirement for justifi-
cation but is nonetheless able to perform the required function. 
Unity and.simplicity in an ethical argument are not necessarily 
virtues, however,· if they are purchased at the expense of ignoring 
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important aspects of the problem or slighting necessary details. In 
general, Brandt has done neither of these. Besides the unique way 
in which he would take account of the moral claims against citizen 
violence, his objective criteria for jusdfiability, high utility/low 
risk, etc., surpass in useful concrete detail all of the other argu-
ments we have discussed, including Zinn's "act utilitarian" argument. 
Brandt's argument is not without fault, however. Utilitarian 
ethical systems are sometimes criticized because they ask us to give 
numerical values (or something like them) to states of being or 
psychological experiences, in order that we can compare them in terms 
of quantities of happiness and unhappiness and decide on the one with 
greatest utility) Brandt seems to require this when he sketches what 
he calls the "outcome analysis" of the act. As long as the act is 
fairly obvious in its overall utility or disutility we can simply 
estimate the quantities involved without being especially uneasy 
about having to assign numbers to such things.2 The problem only 
becomes important in the cases where the outcome is really in doubt. 
In Brandt's argument, the outcome analysis of the act of ruler killing 
in some particular situation would certainly involve, as we have said, 
estimating the effects on society of our violating moral injunctions 
such as that against murder. But it is not clear how this it to be 
accomplished. It is not simply a problem of "getting the facts 
straight," though that in itself would be difficult enough considering 
the complexity of the effects which would result from an act of ruler 
killing. If Brandt agrees that moral rules, like that against murder, 
have a place in ethical thought (he himself cites the effects of 
rules as one of the criteria for deciding justifiability) then the 
I 
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argument must be able to take account of them. Though it still appears 
to be a good way of handling contrary moral claims, the actual process 
of quantifying the disutility of these claims confounds us. We have 
no systematic way to arrive at the necessary quantities in these 
difficult cases. 
Even with this difficulty, however, Brandt•s scheme of justifi-
cation is the most satisfactory of those we have discussed. None of 
them presents a system that could perfectly separate the justifiable 
acts from the unjustifiable and on the basis of which we could build 
the complete defense of an act of ruler killing. In light of the 
fact, however, that the criticism we have made of Brandt•s argument 
is a common one for utilitarian systems and considering that it 
involves a necessary step in the justification process in Brandt•s 
argument, the difficulty may present an insurmountable obstacle to the 
actual utilization of this justification. 
Part of the attraction of utilitarian systems is their simplicity 
and the quality they have of seeming completely self-evident. Compared 
to the varieties of utilitarianism, systems of justice like that 
offered by John Rawls are complicated and unconvincing, at least on 
first viewing. But this system showed no such basic problem with 
justification as we have discovered in Brandt. As it stands, Rawls• 
argument is not as complete as that of Brandt, but there seems to be 
no reason why it could not be carried out far enough (or further 
generalized) to include the act of ruler killing within its scope. 
We were not able to do this because of unclear areas or confusions at 
the edges of the argument, but if Rawls cleared up this confusion such 
an extension of scope might be possible. Of course we might then find 
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that Rawls• argument clearly prohibits ruler killing in any circum-
stances; but if not, the argument presents an interesting possibility 
for ·a justification as complete as Brandt•s. 
Among the writers who have struggled with the justifiability of 
ruler killing and citizen violence in general are many who have 
despaired at one··time,or-o.ther- of ever-being able to finally decide 
such difficult issues. In his own examination of terrorist activity 
Merl eau-Ponty writes: 
But the past and what is distant have been and are still 
lived by men who had and still have only one life to live 
and the screams of a single man condemned to death are 
unforgettab 1 e. 
The anti-Communist refuses to see that violence is 
universal while the exalted sympathizer refuses to see 
that no one can look violence in the face.3 
The reasonable man recoils at the thought of murder for whatever 
reason, 11 No one can look violence in the face... But this repulsion 
itself spurs us to find a rational justification for what seems at 
times to be the only method of preventing great harm. One of the 
most famous seekers for such a rational jus;tification was Albert 
Camus, In the end he concluded that no reasonable justification was 
possible. 
But if man were capable of introducing unity into the 
world entirely on his own, if he could establish the reign, 
by his own decree, of sincerity, innocence, and justice, 
he would be God Himself. Equally, if he could accomplish 
all this, there would be no more reasons for rebellion. 
If rebellion exists, it is because falsehood, injustice, 
and violence are part of the rebel •s condition. He cannot, 
therefore, absolutely claim not to kill or lie, without 
renouncing his rebellion and accepting, once and for all, 
evil and murder. But no more can he agree to kill and 
lie, since the inverse reasoning which would justify 
murder and violence would also destroy the reasons for 
his insurrection. Thus the rebel can never fino peace. 
He knows what is good and, despite himself, doe~ evil. 
The value that supports him is never given to him once and 
for all; he must fight to uphold it, unceasingly.4 
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But despite the contradictions that Camus finds in the position of the 
rebel who must murder to end murder, we still search for a rational 
solution to the problem. The nine authors we have examined attempt 
such a rational justification. The justification of ruler killing 
lies at a perilous boundary between morality and the most terrible 
immorality. 
FOOTNOTES 
1see, for example, D. M. MacKinnon, ~Study~ Ethical Theory 
{London: Adam & Charles Black, 1957), p. 29. 
2Jan Narveson, Morality an~ Utility (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 43. . 
3Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the 
Communist Problem (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p.2. ---
4Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man~ Revolt (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1956):]p. 285. 
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